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CRIMINAL LAW
PREINDICTMENT PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
JAMES F. HOLDERMAN*
The 1970's witnessed an expansion of the federal
prosecutor's role in the enforcement of the federal
criminal law. Armed by Congress at the decade's
inception with potent new investigatory tools,' fed-
eral prosecutors fashioned theories that expanded
the application of various criminal statutes to cover
activities not previously subjected to federal scru-
tiny.2 Spurred by the public outrage resulting from
Watergate and localized political scandals, federal
prosecutors across the country intensified their ef-
forts in the prosecution of white collar crime and
public corruption. As part of this intensified pros-
ecutorial effort, personnel in the United States
Attorneys' offices in several large cities placed an
increased emphasis on the investigation of such
crimes and often became personally involved in
investigations involving the traditional federal
criminal investigatory agencies.3 For example, the
United States Attorney's office in Chicago orga-
nized a specialized unit staffed by experienced
prosecutors whose assigned tasks were to coordinate
*Partner, law office of Sonnenschein Carlin Nath &
Rosenthal, Chicago, and former Assistant United States
Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois.
'The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, § 201(a), 84 Stat. 923 (1970), provided federal
prosecutors with a new immunity statute, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 6001-6003 (1976), with which grand jury testimony
could be compelled; a recalcitrant witness statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1826 (1976), under which witnesses could be
incarcerated for civil contempt if they refused to testify;
and a statutory scheme for the creation of special grand
juries in larger districts, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3334 (1976),
under which the life of such grand juries could be ex-
tended up to three years.
2See*W. SEYMOUR, UNITED STATES A"rroRNEY 174-75
(1975); Henderson, The Expanding Role of Federal Prosecutors
in Combating State and Local Political Corruption, 8 CuM. L.
REv. 385 (1977); Thornburgh, Preface to The United States
Courts of Appeal: 1974-1975 Term Criminal Law and Proce-
dure, 64 GEO. LJ. 173, 174 (1975).3 The offices headquartered in Baltimore, Chicago,
New York, Newark, and Philadelphia were in the fore-
front of such efforts.
and supervise the investigations of alleged financial
crimes and public corruption.4
The expansion of prosecutorial activity in the
1970's, however, was not without criticism from
the bars and the bench.6 Therefore, as the 1980's
commence, some circumspection is in order. Even
a chief advocate of increased prosecutor coordina-
tion and involvement in the investigation of crime,
the United States Attorney for the District of Co-
lumbia, Earl J. Silbert, has warned: "[T]he prose-
cutor's assuming more extensive responsibilities
and exerting increased influence and power in
order to control crime increases his potential and
capacity for abuse."
7
The potential and capacity for prosecutorial
abuse is heightened at the preindictment stage of
the federal criminal process, which historically has
been carried on largely in secret. A defendant's
rights may be irreparably prejudiced at this phase
of ihe criminal process without the defendant, his
lawyer, or the court ever finding out. It is, therefore,
necessary for federal prosecutors at the preindict-
ment stage to be particularly scrupulous in their
conduct. The purpose of this article is to explore
the parameters of prosecutorial conduct at the
investigative stage of the federal criminal justice
system and to consider what is proper prosecutorial
conduct prior to bringing a formal charge against
a defendant.
4 In the early years of the decade, the unit was known
as the Special Investigations Division. It is presently
called the Special Prosecutions Division. Such specialized
units have been encouraged by the Department of Jus-
tice. See Jones, Organizing a Large U.S. Attorney's Office, 5
LITIGATION 34, 37 (1979).
' See, e.g., Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A
Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Poliy, 65 GEO.
L.J. 1171 (1977); Comment, Federal Prosecution of Elected
State Officials for Mail Fraud: Creative Prosecution or an Affront
to Federalism? 28 AM. U.L. REv. 63 (1978).
6See, e.g., United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 497
(7th Cir. 1977) (Swygert, J., dissenting).
7 Silbert, The Role of the Prosecutor in the Process of Criminal
Justice, 63 A.B.A.J. 1717, 1720 (1977).
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I. IMPACT OF PUBLISHED STANDARDS FOR
PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT
Federal prosecutors can look to several published
sources for suggested standards of conduct in prein-
dictment activities. Whether any of these published
standards of conduct have any legally binding
effect on federal prosecutors' actions is questiona-
ble. These published standards do, however, pro-
vide guidance to both prosecutors and the courts
in examining the propriety of prosecutorial con-
duct. Among the published standards which pros-
ecutors ought to consider are the advisory prose-
cutorial standards of conduct issued by various
,professional organizations.8 The federal courts of-
ten refer to such standards in addressing issues of
prosecutorial conduct.9 No published federal deci-
sion has ever granted relief based solely upon a
prosecutor's failure to adhere to these advisory
standards.
Another source of guidance for federal prosecu-
tors is the United States Attorneys' Manual circu-
lated by the Department of Justice. This Manual
is provided "for the internal guidance of the U.S.
Attorneys' Offices and those other organizational
units of the Department concerned with litiga-
tion."'1 The binding effect of the Manual was
considered by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York in United States
v. Shulman." The Shulman court declined to grant a
motion to dismiss that was premised on the failure
of federal prosecutors to comply with a section of
the U.S. Attorneys' Manual. The court offered two
bases for its ruling. First, the court held that the
8 The most widely circulated of these standards in the
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 71-99 (1974) [hereinafter ABA PROSECUTION
STANDARDS]. Other similar materials include the NAT'L
ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMi. JUST. STANDARDS & GOALS,
REPORT ON COURTS (1973) and the NAT'L DISTRICT AT-
TORNEYS Ass'N'S NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS (1977).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 555
(3rd Cir. 1979); United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d
616, 626 (2nd Cir. 1979); United States v. Gold, 470 F.
Supj. 1336, 1344 (N.D. Il1. 1979).
28 C.F.R. § 0.16(b) (1978). Dep't ofJustice, United
States Attorneys' Manual (Aug. 31, 1976) (unpublished
manual available from the Dep't ofJustice) [hereinafter
cited as U.S. Attorneys' Manual]. The nine-part Manual,
prepared by the Executive Office of United States Attor-
neys, is available for purchase from the Executive Office
of United States Attorneys, United States Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, under the disclosure
requirements of the Freedom of Information Act at a per
page fee. Id. § 1-1.400. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
n 466 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
provisions of the U.S. Attorneys' Manual do not
have the same recognized status as the provisions
of the Code of Federal Regulations and, therefore,
do not have the force and effect of law. Second,
the Manual contains an express disclaimer stating
that its provisions were never intended to create
substantive or procedural rights for the benefit of
any party.'
2
The Shulman court relied on this disclaimer to
distinguish its decision from United States v. Caceres,1
3
in which the Ninth Circuit reversed a conviction
because the Internal Revenue Service agents inves-
tigating the defendant had failed to comply with
certain provisions of the IRS Manual. The Shulman
court noted that the IRS Manual contained no
12 The pertinent portion of the U.S. Attorneys' Manual
states:
1-1.100 PURPOSE OF THE MANUAL
This United States Attorneys' Manual is a text
prepared to aid the United States Attorneys and
their Assistants in the performance of their impor-
tant public responsibilities. It is designed to be the
single repository of all materials and general policies
and procedures relevant to the work of the United
States Attorneys' Offices and to their relations with
the Department of Justice with the legal divisions,
investigative agencies, other bureaus and divisions,
and the Office of Management and Finance (see
Administrative Directives System for purely admin-
istrative guidance). The contents of this Manual
are, accordingly, a necessary and invaluable guide
to the United States Attorneys, their Assistants, and
attorneys of the legal divisions in carrying out their
duties and exercising their discretion, under the
direction of the Attorney General, in representing
the United States.
This Manual provides only internal Department
of Justice guidance. It is not intended to, does not,
and may not be relied upon to create any rights,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by
any party in any matter civil or criminal. Nor are
any limitations hereby placed on otherwise lawful
litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.
U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 10, § 1-1.100.
13545 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 440 U.S. 741
(1979). In Caceres, the Ninth Circuit reversed a criminal
conviction for the mere noncompliance with an agency's
administrative regulation absent a constitutional or stat-
utory violation by the agency members. 545 F.2d at 1187.
The Ninth Circuit relied upon its opinion in United
States v. Sourapas, 515 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1975), and that
of the First Circuit in United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d
7, 10 (1st Cir. 1970), as support for its ruling. Several
other courts both before and after Caceres have held to
the contrary. See, e.g., United States v. Mapp, 561 F.2d
685 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'g 420 F. Supp. 461, 464 (E.D.
Wis. 1976); United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076,
1088-89 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Lockyer, 448
F.2d 417, 420-21 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v.




disclaimer like that in the U.S. Attorneys' Man-
ual.'4
At the time of the Shulman decision, the Supreme
Court had granted certiorari and heard argument
in Caceres but had not yet rendered its opinion. s In
Caceres the defendant had attempted to bribe an
IRS agent who, without the knowledge of the
defendant, had been outfitted with electronic sur-
veillance equipment. The Ninth Circuit held that
because the agents who conducted the electronic
surveillance had failed to adhere to the Internal
Revenue Service Manual guidelines for electronic
surveillance operations, the recordings should have
been suppressed. 6
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion
authored by Justice Stevens, reversed the Ninth
Circuit and upheld the defendant's conviction.
17
The Supreme Court expressed concern that an
application of the exclusionary rule to every breach
of agency internal procedural regulations arising
in the context of a criminal prosecution "could
have a serious deterrent impact on the formulation
of additional standards to govern prosecutorial and
police procedures"' 8 and stated that absent a stat-
utory or constitutional violation by the agents,
their breach of the internal agency guidelines did
not require suppression of the recordings. The
Court stated that even though the Administrative
Procedure Act 19 authorized judicial invalidation of
agency action that violated the agency's own reg-
ulations, the case before it was not a suit to inval-
idate agency action, rather it was an appeal from
a criminal conviction, and, therefore, the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act did not provide grounds
for enforcement of the regulations violated by the
agents.
20
The dissent in Caceres found this position unten-
able because in several cases the Supreme Court
had required federal agencies to conform to their
own regulations even though those regulations ex-
ceeded what was necessary to comply with appli-
cable statutes or the Constitution.
2 '
The import of the Caceres case is that persons
adversely affected by a violation of federal agency
internal guidelines will not be afforded relief if
those guidelines surpass the requirements of the
14 466 F. Supp. at 300.
"' See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
16545 F.2d at 1187.
17440 U.S. 741, 744 (1979).
'81d. at 755-56.
'95 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976).
20 440 U.S. at 753-54.
21 Id. at 757 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
Constitution or federal statutes. Surprisingly, the
Supreme Court did not cite" previous authority
upholding prosecutorial action taken in contra-
vention of internal Department of Justice guide-
lines.22 Presumably, the Caceres decision applies to
internal prosecutorial guidelines as well as internal
investigative guidelines. The question the Caceres
decision does leave open, however, is the effect of
agency guidelines which are not merely internal,
but which are promulgated in the Code of Federal
Regulations."
The Code of Federal Regulations does contain
published standards of conduct for Department of
Justice attorneys." Although no published federal
court decision has granted any criminal defendant
relief based solely on a prosecutor's breach of the
standards of conduct contained in the Code of
Federal Regulations, the court in Shulman in dicta
hinted2 that standards promulgated as part of the
Code of Federal Regulations may provide substan-
tive rights to a defendant.
Those standards in the Code are more general
in nature than the guidelines of the United States
Attorneys' Manual and included among the other
provisions in the Code is the statement: "Further-
more, attorneys employed by the Department are
subject to the canons of professional ethics of the
American Bar Association., 26 It could be argued
that federal prosecutors, in addition to their ethical
responsibilities as licensed members of the bar and
officers of the court, may have a duty imposed by
the Code of Federal Regulations to comply fully
with the letter and the spirit of the American Bar
Association canons in fulfilling the responsibilities
of their prosecutorial office. The recent district
court decision, United States v. Gold27 from the
"2 See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 173-74
(1954) (tax indictment upheld notwithstanding the pros-
ecutor's failure to comply with Department of Justice
directive to obtain approval from Attorney General's
office before presenting tax case to the grand jury). See
also United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 818 (5th Cir.
1979).
23See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539 (1959);
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1957).
24 28 C.F.R. §§ 45.735-1 to 45.735-26 (1978).
25 United States v. Shulman, 466 F. Supp. 293, 298
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also United States v. King, 590 F.2d
253, 256-57 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 973
(1979); In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, 813 (5th Cir. 1972).
26 28 C.F.R. § 45-735.1(b) (1978).
27 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979). The court stated:
An attorney for the government who acts both as a
lawyer and as a witness engages in conduct that is
contrary to Ethical Consideration 5-9 and Discipli-
nary Rule 5-101(B) of the ABA Code of Professional
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Northern District of Illinois, appears to have rec-
ognized an obligation of federal prosecutors to
comply with the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity. The Gold court cited the Code of Federal
Regulations provision relating to the Code of
Professional Responsibility as support for dismissal
of the indictment based on prosecutorial impro-
priety during the investigation.
On the other hand, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
ThomasH rejected an argument of a criminal tax
defendant based upon the government's failure to
comply with a specific provision contained in the
Code of Federal Regulations. The specific Code
provision breached in Thomas dealt with the Inter-
nal Revenue Service's procedure of granting a
conference to putative criminal tax defendants
prior to the recommendation of criminal prosecu-
tion.H The Thomas court stated: "Although the rule
is published in the Federal Register and codified
in the Code of Federal Regulations, it is not an
officially promulgated regulation but only a state-
ment or procedure."30 As the apparent discrepancy
between the Gold and Thomas opinions demon-
strates, the issue of whether the Code of Federal
Regulations grants substantive rights to a defend-
ant adversely affected by a prosecutor's specific
breach thereof is far from resolved.
Although the federal courts for the most part
heretofore have declined to grant putative defend-
ants meaningful relief for violations of these pub-
lished standards in the absence of a prosecutorial
violation of a statute or deprivation of constitu-
tional rights, these standards, nonetheless, provide
federal prosecutors with benchmarks for their con-
duct with which they should comply in good faith
in conducting their official functions. Therefore,
throughout this article as various preindictment
prosecutorial activities are discussed, reference will
Responsibility (1975), prohibitions to which govern-
ment attorneys have been made subject by 28
C.F.R. § 45.735-1 (b) and by this court's supervisory
authority.
Id. at 1351. See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RasPON-
SIBILiTy EC 5-9, DR 5-101(B) (1975).
28 593 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1979).
2 26 C.F.R. § 601.107(b)(2) (1979) provides that: "A
taxpayer who may be the subject of a criminal recom-
mendation will be afforded a district Criminal Investi-
gation conference when he requests one...."
ao 593 F.2d at 622. A similar statement could be made
of the standards of conduct provision regarding the can-
ons of professional ethics of the American Bar Association
in 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-1(b) (1978) upon which the court
in United States v. Gold relied.
be made to these various published standards for
comparison with the requirements imposed by fed-
eral court decisions.
II. THE DECISION TO INVESTIGATE AND EMPLOY
THE GRAND JURY
The attorneys who staff the ninety-four United
States Attorneys' offices across the country are the
prosecutors in the federal system that are most
often involved in the decision to investigate alle-
gations of federal crime.3' Charged by statute with
the responsibility within their respective judicial
districts to "prosecute for all offenses against the
United States, 3 2 they traditionally have been al-
lowed by federal courts to utilize broad discretion
in the exercise of their duties.H3 This judicial reluc-
tance to interfere with prosecutorial matters stems
from the constitutional doctrine of separation of
power?" Despite their reluctance, however, the fed-
eral courts have utilized their supervisory power to
curtail prosecutorial misconduct.3 5 Absent miscon-
duct, though, the federal courts have refrained
from delving into matters relating solely to the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
3 6
3i Although the Criminal Division of the Department
of Justice in Washington, D.C., in theory is the head-
quarters for the federal prosecutorial effort, its decision-
making functions primarily consist of reviewing the re-
quests and decisions of the United States Attorneys'
offices.
32 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (1976). Despite the all exclusive
mandate, manpower resources require that the personnel
of the United States Attorney's offices be selective in
prosecuting criminal violations.
3 See, e.g., United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976) (reversing
district court order compelling prosecutor to bring
charges contrary to plea agreement); Nader v. Saxbe, 497
F.2d 676, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dismissing mandamus
action to compel Attorney General to prosecute violations
of Federal Corrupt Practices Act); Inmates of Attica
Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 376
(2d Cir. 1973) (dismissing class action to compel investi-
gation of state officials' management of correctional fa-
cility; held to be solely within prosecutorial discretion).
3 See United States v. Hall, 559 F.2d 1160, 1164 n.2
(9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978); United
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
35 See, e.g., United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877,
881 (9th Cir. 1979) (indictment dismissed because of
prosecutorial impropriety with grandjury); United States
v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3rd Cir. 1979) (case remanded
for determination of effect of prosecutorial impropriety
with grand jury); United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616,
620 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (conviction vacated because
of articulated improper prosecutorial motive).36See United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 113 (6th
Cir. 1977) (prosecutor's -decision to prosecute under
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Although the United States Department of Jus-
tice has published policy guidelines for prosecutors
to use in deciding to initiate formal charges against
a defendant,37 there are few published criteria for
a federal prosecutor to use in deciding to initiate a
criminal investigation. The American Bar Associ-
ation Prosecution Standards state that prosecutors
have an "affirmative responsibility to investigate
illegal activities. ' ' 8 The standards also describe
how a prosecutor should conduct himself with the
grand jury.3 9 The standards, however, do not offer
any suggestions as to what factors a prosecutor
should consider in deciding what allegations of
crime should be investigated or when the grand
jury should be employed in that pursuit.
III. THE USE OF GRAND JURY INVESTIGATORY
POWER
In the federal system each grand jury is empa-
neled by the federal district court of the judicial
district in which that grand jury sits.40 The inves-
tigations conducted by those grand juries, whether
regular grand juries or special grand juries,41 are
primarily controlled by the prosecutors who work
with them. 2 Although the grand jury power to
investigate is broad4 3 and the federal prosecutors
harsher of two statutes discretionary and not reversable);
Martin v. Parratt, 549 F.2d 50, 52 (8th Cir. 1977) (pros-
ecutor's decision to charge defendant under habitual
criminal statute discretionary and not reviewable); cf.
United States v. Olson, 504 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir.
1974) (reversing district court order dismissing four-count
indictment after prosecutor refused to proceed on only
one count).
37 U.S. Department of Justice Materials Relating to
Prosecutorial Discretion (Jan. 18, 1977), reprinted in [1978]
24 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001.
H ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 3.1 (a).
39 Id. § 3.5.
40 18 U.S.C. § 3321 (1976); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a).
41 A regular federal grand jury can be empaneled for
a maximum period of only 18 months. FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(g). The term ofspecial federal grand juries, which may
be empaneled only in judicial districts of populations of
more than four million inhabitants, may be extended
beyond 18 months up to a maximum of 36 months. 18
U.S.C. §§ 3331-3334 (1976).
42 Prosecutors typically decide what witnesses should
appear before the grand jury, draft the subpoenas, and
conduct the primary questioning of the witnesses. Cf.
United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407,413-14 (1920)
("[T]he duty of the district'attorney to direct the atten-
tion of a grand jury to crimes which he thinks have been
committed is coterminous with the authority of the grand
jury to entertain such charges.").
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this notion over
the years. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974), Justice Powell stated:
The scope of the grand jury's powers reflects its
enjoy wide discretion in performing their tasks, the
prosecutors' employment of the grand jury subjects
their conduct to the authority and supervision of
the courts. 4 Therefore, prosecutorial conduct in
using the power of the federal grand jury is not
unfettered.
For example, federal prosecutors' use of the
grand jury's power can only be for the discovery of
criminal activities. Grand jury 'abuse is committed
if a government attorney focuses the investigation
toward uncovering evidence to be used in a civil
action. 45 Although a grand jury proceeding must
special role in insuring fair and effective law enforce-
ment. A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary
hearing in which the guilt or innocence of the
accused is adjudicated. Rather, it is an ex parte
investigation to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether criminal proceedings
should be instituted against any person. The grand
jury's investigative power must be broad if its public
responsibility is adequately to be discharged.
Id. at 343-44. See also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359 (1956). The Supreme Court in Blair v. United States,
250 U.S. 273 (1919), in speaking of the grand jury
declared:
It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of inves-
tigation and inquisition, the scope ofwhose inquiries
is not to be limited narrowly by questions of pro-
priety or forecasts of the probable result of the
investigation, or by doubts whether any particular
individual will be found properly subject to an
accusation of crime. As has been said before, the
identity of the offender, and the precise nature of
the offense, if there be one, normally are developed
at the conclusion of the grand jury's labors, not at
the beginning.
Id. at 282.
In United States v. Brown, 574 F.2d 1274, 1275-76
(5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit stated:
By its very nature, the grand jury process is not an
adversary proceeding. Its function is merely to de-
termine if there is probable cause which warrants
the defendant's being bound over for trial. A de-
fendant has no right to require that the Government
present all available evidence at this proceeding.
The grand jury proceeding is a one-sided affair. The
defendant is protected from such one-sidedness
when, at the trial on the merits, he is "accorded the
full protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments" and is "permitted to expose all of the facts
bearing upon his guilt or innocence."
Id. at 1275-76 (quoting in part United States v. Chanen,
549 F.2d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir. 1977)).
"See United States v. Owen, 580 F.2d 365, 367 (9th
Cir. 1978); In re Melvin, 546 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1976);
United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir.
1975); United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 786, 793
(9th Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Howard, 560
F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1975).45 See FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 567 F.2d 96, 104-
05 (D.C. Cir. 1977); In re Wood, 430 F. Supp. 41
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
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be terminated when it becomes clear that a crimi-
nal prosecution will not be forthcoming,4 6 the
abuse of grand jury power for civil discovery often
cannot be raised until the commencement of a civil
action based on that impermissibly obtained evi-
dence.4 7
Another abuse of the grand jury's investigative
power occurs when a prosecutor uses a grand jury
to gather evidence to prove the charges of an
indictment that has already been returned.' But
evidence uncovered during the course of a contin-
uing grand jury investigation may be used at the
trial of a previously pending charge.4 9 In order to
reconcile these seemingly conflicting principles and
determine whether the prosecutor's use of evidence
obtained postindictment by a grand jury was im-
proper, the federal courts generally look to the
prosecutor's intent in conducting the investigation
from which the evidence was derived. The test
employed in such a situation is the "sole or domi-
nating purpose" test, articulated in United States v.
Dardi.W
In Dardi, an indicted defendant's former secre-
tary was called to testify before the grand jury. The
187 F. Supp. 55 (D.N.J. 1960) (opinion on remand from
356 U.S. 677 (1958)). Under the Supreme Court's ruling
in United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298
(1978), IRS civil investigatory summonses became unen-
forcible once criminal prosecution was recommended.
"Parallel" and simultaneous civil investigatory proceed-
ings by the SEC after criminal referral were approved in
SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., [1979] 26 CRIM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2274.46 See United States v. Pennsalt Chem. Corp., 260 F.
Supp. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
47 In re Special March 1974 Grand Jury, 541 F.2d 166,
170-72 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977);
In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury (Shotwell), 239 F.2d
263, 271 (7th Cir. 1956).48 See United States v. Doss, 563 F.2d 265 (6th Cir.
1977); United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d 261, 266 (5th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242 (6th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977); United States
v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656, 664 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 826 (1975); United States v. Star, 470 F.2d 1214
(9th Cir. 1972); In re Archuleta, 432 F. Supp. 583, 596
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Wood, 430 F. Supp. 41, 47
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Pilliteri, 420 F. Supp. 913, 914
(W.D. Pa. 1976).
49 See United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 147 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); United States
v. George, 444 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1971); In re Grand Jury
Investigation (General Motors Corp.), 32 F.R.D. 175, 183
(S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 318 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 802 (1963); In re Texas Co., 27 F. Supp.
847, 851 (E.D. Ill. 1939).
503 30 F.2d 316, 336 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845
(1964).
defendant contended that the appearance was a
misuse of the grand jury, but the government
responded that this testimony related to the inves-
tigation of a possible conspiracy to obstruct justice.
The court held that since the government's action
was not for the "sole or dominating purpose of
preparing an already pending indictment for trial,"
the postindictment use of the grand jury was per-
missible.
5 1
The federal courts in applying the "sole or dom-
inating purpose" test have upheld several postin-
dictment uses of the grand jury. For example, it
has been held permissible for a prosecutor to use a
grand jury to investigate yet uncharged criminal
offenses arising from the area of activity under
investigation 52 and to discover the existence of
unknown coconspirators to a previously charged
crime. 53 Postindictment grand jury investigation to
discover potential alibi witnesses was criticized by
the court, but held not to require reversal unless
the defendant could prove prejudice.5 But the
postindictment use of the grand jury to question a
defendant about an offense for which he had been
secretly indicted was held to constitute prosecuto-
rial abuse requiring reversal.5"
A question not yet addressed by the federal
courts arises when the "sole or dominating" pur-
pose of the grand jury investigation is shifted by
the prosecutor. After potentially useful trial evi-
dence is discovered as an incident of a legitimate
continuing investigation, a prosecutor may shift
the purpose of the investigation in order to fully
develop that evidence through the use of the grand
jury for maximum benefit at the trial of the pend-
ing charge. To protect against this abuse, federal
courts confronting the issue of postindictment use
of the grand jury should not look just at the
prosecutor's purpose at the investigation's incep-
5' 330 F.2d at 336 (quoting trial court opinion).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 1270 (1st
Cir. 1972); In re Russo, 448 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1971). See
also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 586 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.
1978).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320,
1328 (10th Cir. 1979); Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d
732 (5th Cir. 1972).
54 See United States v. Sellaro, 514 F.2d 114, 121-22
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975). See also
In re Santiago, 533 F.2d 727, 730 (1st Cir. 1976).
' See, e.g., United States v. Doss, 563 F.2d 265 (6th
Cir. 1977) (en banc). The courts have allowed prosecutors
to call indicted defendants to the grand jury to question
them about other criminal activities. See, e.g., Beverly v.
United States, 468 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1972); In re Russo,
448 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1971).
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tion but should examine the prosecutor's purpose
in utilizing the grand jury at the time the actual
evidence is uncovered.
IV. THE USE OF GRAND JURY SUBPOENA POWER
A federal grand jury has nationwide subpoena
power but that power is not independent of the
United States District Court of the jurisdiction in
which it sits. As provided in rule 17 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the clerk of the court
issues grand jury subpoenas in blank for comple-
tion and service. 6
A. THE "OFFICE" SUBPOENA
Government attorneys engaged in grand jury
investigations properly may have subpoenas issued
without the grand jury's authorization or aware-
ness5 7 to compel attendance of witnesses before the
grand jury, but they may not use the grand jury
subpoena power to gather information without the
intended participation of the grand jury.m The
practice of issuing a grand jury subpoena as a ploy
to secure the attendance of a witness at the prose-
cutor's office is considered unprofessional conduct
by the American Bar Association Prosecution Stan-
' FED. R. CuM. P. 17(a) in pertinent part provides
that: "The clerk shall issue a subpoena, signed and sealed
but otherwise in blank to a party requesting it, who shall
fill in the blanks before it is served." Although rule 17
does not specify its application to grand jury subpoenas,
that application has been recognized by the courts. See In
re Lopreato, 511 F.2d 1150, 1152-53 (1st Cir. 1975);
Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933,936 (9th Cir. 1971).
See also In re Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 589
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).57 See United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 206, 210 (3d
Cir. 1979).
m United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 985 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977) ("Neither the FBI
nor the Strike Force nor the United States Attorney has
been granted subpoena power for office interrogation
outside the presence of the grand jury."); United States
v. Keen, 509 F.2d 1273, 1274-75 (6th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Hedge, 462 F.2d 220, 222-23 (5th Cir. 1972); In
re Wood, 430 F. Supp. 41, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United
States v. Th6mas, 320 F. Supp. 527, 529-30 (D.D.C.
1970) (United States Attorney's office for the District of
Columbia enjoined from issuing "phony summons" to
obtain office interviews); cf. United States v. Miller, 500
F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S.
435 (1976) (the circuit court held unlawful subpoenas
duces tecum requiring bank presidents to appear; the
subpoenas had been issued to a U.S. attorney and issued
when the grand jury was not in session). See also United
States v. D'Andrea, 585 F.2d 1351, 1365 (7th Cir. 1978)
(Swygert, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979);
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884, 897
(7th Cir. 1963).
dards59 and has been severely criticized and con-
demned by the courts.6° Absent a pervasive prose-
cutorial practice of using subpoenas for the purpose
of obtaining office interviews, the federal courts,
however, appear reluctant to administer sanc-
tions.6'
B. PREAPPEARANCE INTERVIEW OR REVIEW
Often witnesses who are subpoenaed for a grand
jury appearance desire a preappearance conference
with the prosecutor to determine their status in the
investigation. Similarly, a prosecutor may wish to
informally interview a witness who has been sub-
poenaed to determine whether the witness has any
information of value to the grand jury. The prac-
tice of conducting a preappearance interview with
a subpoenaed grand jury witness has received ju-
dicial approval on the ground that it assists in
eliminating unnecessary inconvenience to both the
witness and the grand jury that would be caused
by examining a witness at a grand jury session who
had no information of benefit to the grand jury's
investigation.6
59 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 3.1(d)
states: "It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to
secure the attendance of persons for interviews by use of
any communication which has the appearance or color
of a subpoena or similar judicial process unless he is
authorized by law to do so."
6o See, e.g., Durbin v. United States, 221 F.2d 520 (D.C.
Cir. 1954):
"The Constitution of the United States, the stat-
utes, the traditions of our law, the deep rooted
preferences of our people speak clearly. They rec-
ognize the primary and nearly exclusive role of the
GrandJury as the agency of compulsory disclosure."
They do not recognize the United States Attorney's
office as a proper substitute for the grand jury room
and they do not recognize the use of a grand jury
subpoena, a process of the District Court, as a
compulsory administrative process of the United
States Attorney's office.
It was clearly an improper use of the District
Court's process for the Assistant United States At-
tomey to issue a grand jury subpoena for the pur-
poses of conducting his own inquisition.
Id. at 522 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v.
O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248, 250-51 (D. Mass. 1953)).
61 Cf United States v. D'Andrea, 585 F.2d 1351, 1357
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979) (majority
of court found no reversible error in prosecutor using trial
subpoena to obtain office interview of one witness who
had been advised by his counsel that he was not required
to appear at the interview).
See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033,
1040 (D. Md. 1976) (procedure proper "in absence of
compelling evidence of abuse of process'). See also United
States v. International Paper Co., 457 F. Supp. 571, 575-
76 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (the prosecutor's use of agents to
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When a prosecutor decides on the basis of a
preappearance interview to excuse a subpoenaed
witness from testifying before the grand jury,6 the
situation closely resembles the "office subpoena"
practice condemned by the courts. Whether abuse
has been committed should depend on the intent
of the prosecutor in causing the service of the
subpoena. If the prosecutor actually intended to
use the witness before the grand jury, but decided
the witness had no information and therefore ex-
cused the witness, no abuse has been committed. If
the prosecutor's purpose in having the grand jury
subpoena served was to secure an interview with
the witness, the prosecutor has abused his office.
To avoid potential abuse, prosecutors should advise
a grand jury of their decision not to call a sub-
poenaed witness so an accurate record can be made
of the grand jury's authorization of this decision.
Otherwise, prosecutors may be considered to have
withheld evidence from the grand jury.
64
A similar situation arises when a witness has
been subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury
to present nontestimonial evidence such as finger-
prints or handwriting exemplars. Typically, this
type of evidence is not obtained in the grand jury's
presence because handwriting exemplars and fin-
gerprints are usually not meaningful to the grand
jury without review and analysis. To conserve the
grand jury's time, prosecutors often have the ma-
terial analyzed after it has been acquired (through
the use of grand jury subpoenas), but before the
material or the witness providing it has actually
been presented to the grand jury. Where prosecu-
tors conducting a grand jury investigation have not
obtained the approval or direction of the grand
jury to proceed with the requisition of the material
through the use of the subpoena power, their ac-
summarize in the grand jury the statements of sub-
poenaed witnesses at interviews outside the grand jury's
presence was upheld); Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Direc-
tor of IRS, 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
6 Although it has been accepted practice for prosecu-
tors to excuse the appearance of subpoenaed grand jury
witnesses, some courts have questioned whether a prose-
cutor has the power apart from the grand jury to do so.
See, e.g., In re Nwamu, 421 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (S.D.N.Y.
1976). See also United States v. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191,
204 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Cf In re Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 587 F.2d
889, 893 (7th Cir. 1978) (court upheld district court's
denial of hearing on whether government unlawfully
withheld evidence from the grand jury by dismissing
prospective witnesses from their scheduled appearances
because petitioner presented "no concrete evidence" sug-
gesting that the government breached its duty).
tions have been held to be an abuse of the grand
jury subpoena power.6
The prosecutor in In re Melvin initially sub-
poenaed Melvin to appear before a grand jury,
which then directed Melvin to submit to finger-
printing and photographing. Melvin first refused
to submit to the tests and did so only upon court
order compelling him to comply with the grand
jury's direction. The prosecutor then sought to
compel Melvin's appearance at a lineup and was
able to obtain a court order compelling Melvin's
appearance without any grand jury authorization
or direction. On a writ of mandamus, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit va-
cated that order and held that in the absence of a
specific direction from the grand jury, the entry of
the order was improper. The court stated:
The order involves a major intrusion upon personal
liberty which, if justified, is justified only upon the
basis of the grand jury's unique investigative pow-
ers....
In any event, the broadest delegation of a power
of this magnitude to the United States Attorney
cannot be accepted if the grand jury's own role is to
remain at all meaningful.
67
In United States v. O'Kane68 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida
reached the same result. In O'Kane the prosecutor
met O'Kane and other subpoenaed grand jury
witnesses when, in response to subpoenas, they
appeared in the reception room of the United
States Attorney's office. The prosecutor then re-
quested that they provide handwriting exemplars
in furtherance of the grand jury's investigation.
The witnesses were told that they could provide
the exemplars voluntarily or be brought before the
court and ordered to do so on pain of contempt.
O'Kane and the others provided the exemplars
voluntarily and were later brought before the
grand jury. At no time did the grand jury direct
O'Kane or the others to provide the exemplars.
After O'Kane was indicted, the district court
granted his motion to suppress the exemplars on
6See, e.g., In re Melvin, 546 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976);
United States v. O'Kane, 439 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Fla.
1977).
6 546 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976).
67 Id. at 5. Once the grand jury directed that Melvin
appear in the lineup, the First Circuit affirmed a district
court's order compelling that appearance. In re Melvin,
550 F.2d 674 (1st Cir. 1977). Other courts have validated
such grand jury direction. See United States v. Balliro,
558 F.2d 1177, 1179 (5th Cir. 1977).
68 439 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
[Vol. 71
PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT
the basis that they were obtained without grand
jury directive.6s
Both the Melvin court and the O'Kane court held
that when evidence was obtained outside the grand
jury's presence through the use of a grand jury
subpoena without a directive from the grand jury,
it was "no mere technical error ... but an error
affecting the proper roles of the prosecutor and the
grand jury, since to endorse such a procedure
would be to allow the United States Attorney to
assume the powers of a grand jury. 7 0 Thus, pros-
ecutors wishing to insure the propriety of their
actions must consult with and obtain authorization
from a grand jury whenever the subpoena power
is to be employed for the acquisition of evidence
outside the grand jury room.
C. REQUIRING PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND
OTHER MATERIALS
The federal prosecutors' ability to use the broad
power of the grand jury to compel the production
of documents by subpoena is, like other matters of
prosecutorial conduct, not without limitation. Rule
17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides a framework within which federal prose-
cutors must work in drafting subpoenae duces
tecum for issuance on behalf of a grand jury.
71
Motions to quash a grand jury subpoena duces
tecum have been granted where the amount of
material being sought is excessive or beyond the
possible focus of the investigation 72 or is privi-
leged.7
9Id. at 214-15.
70 United States v. O'Kane, 439 F. Supp. at 215 (quot-
ing nre Melvin, 546 F.2d at 4).
71 ule 17(c) states:
A subpoena may also command the person to whom
it is directed to produce the books, papers, docu-
ments or other objects designated therein. The court
on motion made promptly may quash or modify the
subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or
oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers,
documents or objects designated in the subpoena be
produced before the court at a time prior to the trial
or prior to the time when they are to be offered in
evidence and may upon their production permit the
books, papers, documents or objects or portions
thereof to be inspected by the parties and their
attorneys.
FEn. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
7 In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 867 (1973); In re 1979 Grand Jury Subpoena,
478 F. Supp. 59, 62-63 (M.D. La. 1979); In re Morgan,
377 F. Supp. 281, 284-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 33 F. Supp. 367 (M.D.N.C. 1940).
7a Constitutional privileges such as the fifth amend-
ment may be asserted to defeat the requirement of doe-
The courts usually consider three elements in
determining whether a subpoena duces tecum has
been properly drawn. First, the materials sought
must be relevant to the investigation being pur-
sued;7 4 second, the subpoena must sufficiently de-
scribe the material sought with reasonable partic-
ularity; 75 and third, the volume of material sought
ument production before the grand jury under certain
circumstances. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85,
88-101 (1974) (privilege available to individuals and sole
proprietorships, but not to partnerships or corporations);
United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950); United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944). See also Curcio v.
United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957) (corporate custodian
may assert privilege if asked to explain or interpret
produced records); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1
(1948) (fifth amendment privilege may not be claimed to
preclude production of "required records"). The attor-
ney-client privilege and attorney work-product doctrine
likewise apply to grand jury proceedings and may be
asserted to preclude production of materials. See, e.g., In
re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979); In
re GrandJury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
4 The question of relevance in a grand jury context is
substantially less demanding than the traditional trial
standard. Something is relevant if it is reasonably related
to the overall subject matter of the investigation. Okla-
homa Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209
(1946); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 459 F. Supp. 1335
(E.D. Pa. 1978); In re Special November 1975 Grand
Jury, 433 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Ill. 1977); In re Morgan,
377 F. Supp. 281, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). If the documents
required to be produced under subpoena have no appar-
ent relevance, the subpoena will be quashed. See, e.g., In
re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 79-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 867 (1973); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d
855, 861-62 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
See also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 391 F. Supp. 991
(D.R.I. 1975), and the eases cited therein.
75 The "reasonable particularity" standard typically
applied by the courts is that the items requested be
described in a fashion "that a person attempting to
exercise a subpoena may in good faith know what he is
being asked to produce." In re Corrado Bros., 367 F.
Supp. 1126, 1132 (D. Del. 1973); see Brown v. United
States, 276 U.S. 134, 143 (1928) (subpoena must specify
a reasonable time period and specify with reasonable
particularity the subject to which the documents called
for relate); In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1975) (broad categories acceptable
if each is particularly described); In re Harry Alexander,
Inc., 8 F.R.D. 559, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (documents
sufficiently described so they can "readily be located by
an intelligent clerk'); In re Eastman Kodak Co., 7 F.R.D.
760, 763 (W.D.N.Y. 1947) (documents to be produced
need only be described with detail sufficient to enable
recipient of subpoena to produce them); United States v.
Medical Soc'y, 26 F. Supp. 55, 57 (D.D.C. 1938) (the
subpoena should specify with reasonable particularity
the subject to which the desired materials relate). The
federal courts appear to apply the standard of "reasona-
ble particularity" more stringently the longer the time
1980]
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must be reasonable within the context of the inves-
tigation. 76 A prosecutor conducting his activities
period covered by the subpoena. See In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 342 F. Supp. 709, 713 (D. Md.
1972); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Provi-
sion Salesmen and Distributors Union, Local 627), 203
F. Supp. 575, 578-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
7' The "reasonableness" requirement encompasses two
criteria. The time period covered by the subpoena must
not be excessive within the context of the investigation
and the volume of material sought must not be oppressive
to the subpoenaed party. See generally Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906). See also Vaira, Use of the GrandJury to
Obtain Business Records, 59 CHi. B. REc. 32 (1977). As to
the time period, the general federal five-year statute of
limitations is not a controlling factor. See Coson v. United
States, 533 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1976); In re United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 73 F. Supp. 207 (D. Mass. 1947). The
factors relating to time period reasonableness included:
"[1] the type and extent of the investigation; [2] the
materiality of the subject matter to the type of investi-
gation; [3] the particularity with which the documents
are described; [4] the good faith of the party demanding
the broad coverage; [and 5] a showing of need for such
extended coverage." In re Linen Supply Cos., 15 F.R.D.
115, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The federal courts have ap-
peared to set a 10-year limit. See In re Investigation of
World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 282-83 (D.D.C.
1952); In re Eastman Kodak Co., 7 F.R.D. 760 (W.D.N.Y.
1947) (subpoena limited to 10 years without further
showing). See also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 33 F.
Supp. 367, 371 (M.D.N.C. 1940) (subpoena requesting
10-year period upheld for some defendants). They have,
however, not always adhered to it. See, e.g., In re Radio
Corp. of America, 13 F.R.D. 167, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
(18 years); In re Borden Co., 75 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ill.
1948) (20 years). But see In re Grand Jury Investigation
(General Motors Corp.), 174 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) (11- to 30-year subpoena relating to every phase of
a corporation's business quashed); In re Grand Jury In-
vestigation, 33 F. Supp. 367, 372 (M.D.N.C. 1940) (10-
year subpoena modified for some defendants); United
States v. Medical Soc'y, 26 F. Supp. 55 (D.D.C. 1938)
(22-year subpoena quashed in part).
As to the oppressiveness of the subpoena to the party
upon which it is served, the mere volume of the material
sought is not conclusive of the issue of oppressiveness. See
In re Certain Chinese Family Benevolent and Dist. Ass'ns,
19 F.R.D. 97, 100-01 (N.D. Cal. 1956). The volume of
material is, however, a factor to be considered by prose-
cutors in drafting subpoenas. In In re Grand Jury Inves-
tigation (General Motors Corp.), 174 F. Supp. 393
(S.D.N.Y. 1956), the court quashed a subpoena that
would have required "production of practically every
paper outside of routine correspondence relating to every
phase of the corporation's affairs, in an unlimited explo-
ratory investigation ... 'whose purposes and limits can
be determined only as it proceeds.' " Id. at 395 (footnote
omitted). See also In re Nadelson, 353 F. Supp. 971
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); In re Harry Alexander, Inc., 8 F.R.D.
559 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Another factor considered is the
cost of copying the subpoenaed documents which rests
on the party subpoenaed, unless that cost is oppressive.
properly should give each of these factors individ-
ual consideration in preparing a grand jury sub-
poena duces tecum.
If a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum is
filed alleging that the material sought is not rele-
vant to the matter under investigation, most federal
courts require that the government make a showing
of relevance.7 7 Prima facie relevance of the material
sought to the matter under investigation is usually
established by the government through an argu-
ment based on the face of the subpoena, or it can
submit a prosecutor's affidavit stating the connec-
tion between the scope of the investigation and
subpoenaed materials.
78
See United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928 (3d Cir.
1976) (court may require government to pay, but only
upon individualized showing that cost of compliance
exceeded reasonable cost of doing business); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 436 F. Supp. 46,48-49 (D.
Md. 1977). In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
(Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc.), 405 F.
Supp. 1192, 1198-1200 (N.D. Ga. 1975), affidavits by the
subpoenaed party showed that production would con-
sume from 125,700 to 243,249 manhours and would cost
between $908,811 and S 1,759,015.62 as compared with a
yearly net income of $9,634. The court ordered the
government either to advance the costs of inspecting,
assembling, and photocopying the documents or to do
the job itself. A section of the Right to Financial Privacy
Act of 1978, which became effective Oct. 1, 1979, directs
the government to reimburse financial institutions for
reasonable expenses incurred in the production of sub-
poenaed financial records. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3405 (West
Supp. 1979).
See In re Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975,
529 F.2d 543, 549 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992
(1976); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 507 F.2d 963, 965-
67 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975); In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 425 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Fla. 1977); In
re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Southern Motor
Carriers Rate Conference, Inc.), 405 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D.
Ga. 1975); cf. In re the Special April 1977 Grand Jury,
581 F.2d 592, 593-94 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1046
(1978) (subpoenas served by a federal grand jury staff of
state attorney general were enforceable where the grand
jury had not embarked on a fishing expedition into the
affairs of the state). Contra, In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
555 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179,
184 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1975).
78 See, e.g., Universal Mfg. Co. v. United States, 508
F.2d 684, 686 n.2 (8th Cir. 1975) (applied presumption
of regularity of grand jury proceedings, refusing to follow
Third Circuit rule which requires the government to
make minimum showing of relevance by affidavit in all
challenged cases); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 507 F.2d
963, 965-66 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975)
(requiring the government to make a minimum showing
of relevance to justify a challenged subpoena); Schwim-
mer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 862-63 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); In re Grand Jury Inves-
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D. ALLOWING TIME FOR COMPLIANCE WITH
SUBPOENA
Although federal prosecutors traditionally grant
a subpoenaed party a reasonable amount of time
within which to comply with a grand jury sub-
poena, the law does not establish a minimum
period of time that prosecutors must allow. The
few existing reported decisions regarding the time
that should be allowed a subpoenaed witness for
compliance have recognized the power of the fed-
eral court to require immediate compliance with
process in appropriate circumstances. For example,
in United States v. Polizzi 9 the court held that a
three-day notice period for a testimonial subpoena
was not automatically unreasonable. In United
States v. Re, ° the court stated that "the direction of
a subpoena duces tecum to produce documents forth-
with is not per se invalid."
Forthwith subpoenas are rarely used by federal
prosecutors. The United States Attorneys' Manual
states that:
All grand jury witnesses should be accorded reason-
able advance notice of their appearance before the
grand jury. "Forthwith" or "eo instanter' subpoenas
should be used only when swift action is important
and then only with the prior approval of the United
States Attorney. Considerations, among others,
which bear upon the desirability of using such sub-
poenas include the following: 1) the risk of flight; 2)
the risk of destruction or fabrication of evidence; 3)
the need for the orderly presentation of evidence;
and 4) the degree of inconvenience to the witness.
8 1
Unlike a search warrant, which is issued only upon
a finding of probable cause by a judicial officer,
8 2
a forthwith subpoena requiring immediate produc-
tion of the subpoenaed material can be issued
without any judicial involvement. A defendant
harmed by improper service of such a subpoena
may be held to lack standing to contest an abuse
of such process.s0
tigation, 425 F. Supp. 717, 719 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (govern-
ment's statement in open court corroborated by foremen's
testimony regarding the violations being investigated was
sufficient; court found that affidavit by prosecutor was
not necessary); In re Corrado Bros., 367 F. Supp. 1126,
1131 (D. Del. 1973).
79323 F. Supp. 222, 225 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd on other
grounds, 450 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1971).
80 313 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also In re Kelly,
19 F.R.D. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
8t U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 10, § 9-11.230
(Aug. 17, 1978).
8 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
a In United States v. Hilton, 534 F.2d 556, 564-65 (3d
Two decisions from the Southern District of New
York both dealing with forthwith subpoenas but
each reaching different results provide guidance as
to the issues that arise from the service of a sub-
poena requiring immediate compliance. In United
States v. Re8' federal agents, at the direction of an
assistant United States attorney, served respondent
at his home at 8 a.m. with a subpoena duces tecum.
The subpoena required him to produce records
before a grand jury that same morning. The re-
spondent told the agents that he could not appear
before the grand jury that morning because he had
to go to work. An assistant United States attorney
arrived at the respondent's home and suggested
that the respondent's appearance could be excused
if he would agree to turn the subpoenaed records
over to one of the agents that evening and not to
tamper with them in the meantime. The respon-
dent agreed and complied that evening.
The investigation eventually led to the indict-
ment of someone other than the respondent. The
defendant in Re moved to suppress the documents
based on a fourth amendment challenge to the
forthwith subpoena. The court denied the motion,
but was able to avoid the question of whether
forthwith subpoenas violate the fourth amend-
ment. The court simply held that a "seizure" did
not take place in that case because the enforcement
of the subpoena forthwith was excused and the
respondent "voluntarily complied" by turning over
the documents to the agent.ss
In re Nwarmus6 came before the Southern District
of New York on a motion to quash a forthwith
subpoena and force a return of the documents. In
Nwamu an FBI agent served a forthwith subpoena
on a corporate officer calling for the production
before a grand jury of certain corporate records on
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976), the court refused to
suppress a "forthwith" subpoena issued by a federal
prosecutor to a bank calling for production of the sub-
poenaed material "to any agent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, who was designated therein as the 'agent
of the grand jury."' The grand jury was not sitting and
was therefore unavailable to accept the "forthwith" pro-
duction. The court held the defendant lacked standing
to raise a fourth amendment claim in the bank records,
cf. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (defendant
possessed no fourth amendment interest in bank records
that could be indicated by a challenge to the subpoena
duces tecum), but criticized the prosecutor's conduct. See
also United States v. Digilio, 538 F.2d 972, 984-85 (3d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
84 313 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
85 Id. at 448-49.
86 421 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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that same day. The officer attempted unsuccess-
fully to reach the corporation's attorney. He then
located the files sought by the subpoena and was
told by the agent that "the records should be
produced immediately."8 7 The corporate officer
asked the agent what the consequences would be
of refusing to comply and was told that he "would
be in contempt of court. ' ' s The agent then stated
that he "would take the documents in lieu of his
[the officer's] appearance before a federal grand
jury."89 The officer agreed, and the agent took the
subpoenaed files. Instead of going to the grand
jury, the agent took the files to the FBI office.
The next day agents returned to the corporate
offices with three more forthwith subpoenas. This
time an attempt to telephone the corporation's
attorney was successful. The attorney told the
agent over the phone that "'[n]othing is to leave
that office.'"" The agent, who already had posses-
sion of the subpoenaed items, disregarded the at-
torney's request and left the premises with the
subpoenaed items.
The court in Nwamu quashed the subpoena and
ordered the return of the materials to the corpora-
tion. The court stated:
We find, therefore, upon consideration of the totality
of circumstances here, that compliance with the
subpoenas would be unreasonable and oppressive;
that neither movants nor their employees voluntarily
consented to surrender of the subpoenaed items; and
that the agents' taking of the subpoenaed items
constitute[s] an unreasonable and unlawful search
and seizure.91
Neither the Re court nor the Nwamu court ad-
dressed the issue of the prosecutor's failure to ob-
tain grand jury authorization or direction for the
forthwith production of records outside the grand
jury room. 92 But federal prosecutors, to avoid im-
propriety in the use of forthwith subpoenas, should
first consult with the grand jury and obtain ap-
proval of forthwith process. Similarily, prosecutors
should also obtain prior grand jury approval if the
agent serving the subpoena intends to take imme-
diate custody of the subpoenaed materials as an
accommodation to the witness upon whom the





9' Id. at 1367.
9 See In re Melvin, 546 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1976); United
States v. O'Kane, 439 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
V. INSIDE THE GRAND JURY ROOM
A. THE PROSECUTOR'S ROLE AND FUNCTION
Once a federal prosecutor enters a grand jury
session he has two functions-one, as advocate for
the government and the other, as advisor to the
grand jury.93 As to the prosecutor's relationship
with the grand jury, the American Bar Association
PROSECUTION STANDARDS state:
3.5 Relations with grand jury.
(a) Where the prosecutor is authorized to act as
legal advisor to the grand jury he may appropriately
explain the law and express his opinion on the legal
significance of the evidence but he should give due
deference to its status as an independent legal body.
(b) The prosecutor should not make statements
or arguments in an effort to influence grand jury
action in a manner which would be impermissible
at trial before a petit jury.
(c) The prosecutor's communications and presen-
tations to the grand jury should be on the record.9
93 See United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 628
(2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (quoting Berger
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)) ("The ex parte
character of grand jury proceedings makes it peculiarly
important for a federal prosecutor to remember that, in
the familiar phrase, the interest of the United States 'in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done.' ") The portion from the Berger
opinion to which Judge Friendly in Ciambrone refers is a
standard by which every prosecutor should conduct all
his official actions:
The United States Attorney is the representative
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prose-
cution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or inno-
cence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and
vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful convic-
tion as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.
295 U.S. at 88. See also United States v. Asdrubal-Herrera,
470 F. Supp. 939, 943 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
9 ABA PROSE CUrION STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 3.5.
The comments to § 3.5, which further articulate stan-
dards by which a prosecutor should conduct himself
before the grand jury, state:
A prosecutor should not, however, take advantage
of his role as the ex parte representative of the state
before the grand jury to unduly or unfairly influence
it in voting upon charges brought before it. In
general, he should be guided by the standards governing and
defining the proper presentation of the state's case in an
adversary trial before a petit jury.
Id. § 3.5 comments (emphasis added).
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PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT
The United States Attorneys' Manual states:
In his dealings with the grand jury, the prosecutor
must always conduct himself as an officer of the
court whose function is to insure that justice is done
and that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
He must recognize that the grand jury is an inde-
pendent body, whose functions include not only the
investigation of crime and the initiation of criminal
prosecution but also the protection of the citizenry
from unfounded criminal charges. The prosecutor's
responsibility is to advise the grand jury on the law
and to present evidence for its consideration. In
discharging these responsibilities, he must be scru-
pulously fair to all witnesses and must do nothing to
inflame or otherwise improperly influence the grand
jurors.9s
For the most part, fulfillment of a prosecutor's
dual obligation when he is appearing before the
grand jury depends on the personal integrity of the
prosecutor. If a conflict arises between a prosecu-
tor's role as an advocate and his role as the grand
jury's advisor, fairness dictates that the role of
advisor must take precedence.
96
B. WHO MAY ATrEND SESSIONS
In the federal system, attorneys representing
grand jury witnesses and putative defendants, and
all but certain authorized persons, are excluded
from attendance at grand jury sessions.97 Rule 6(d)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure iden-
tifies the people authorized to be present when the
grand jury is in session.98 The presence of an un-
95 United States Attorneys' Manual, supra note 10, § 9-
11.015 (Aug. 17, 1978).
96 See United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 573-
74 (2d Cir. 1953) (Hand, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 913 (1954).97 See United States v. Fitch, 472 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.
1973); In re Grumbles, 453 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1971); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 6(d). See also In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330
(1957). Prosecutors must, however, allow a witness a
reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel outside
the grand jury room. See In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806 (5th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Weinberg, 439 F.2d 743 (9th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Leighton, 265 F. Supp. 27
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
98 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d) states: "Who May Be Present.
Attorneys for the government, the witness under exami-
nation, interpreters when needed and, for the purpose of
taking the evidence, a stenographer or operator of a
recording device may be present while the grand jury is
deliberating or voting." Not all lawyers employed by the
United States government come within the scope of the
phrase "attorneys for the government." Rule 54(c) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure defines "attorney
for the government" to mean the Attorney General or an
authorized assistant of the Attorney General, a United
authorized person at a grand jury session may, but
does not automatically, vitiate an indictment.9
Although the language of the rule is clear, its
application has created some recent controversy in
the federal courts. The debate revolves around two
issues: first, whether the prior involvement of an
appointed special attorney with an agency inves-
tigation of the same matter that the grand jury is
investigating disqualifies that attorney and makes
him an unauthorized person before the grand jury
in violation of rule 6(d); second, whether a federal
prosecutor's attendance at grand jury sessions sub-
sequent to his appearance as a witness in the same
investigation makes him an unauthorized person
in those subsequent sessions in violation of rul'
6(e).
The federal courts are split on both issues. As to
the first, however, the Seventh Circuit,'t ° the Third
States attorney or an authorized assistant of a United
States attorney. FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(c). The courts have
held that government attorneys for certain divisions of
the Department of Justice and other departments and
agencies are not government attorneys within the mean-
ing of rule 6(d) and must get specific authority to attend
a grand jury session. This is usually accomplished pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 515 (1976). See In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962) (antitrust divi-
sion attorneys must get specific authorization); In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (SEC lawyers not "attorneys for the government"
within rule 6(d)); United States v. General Elec. Co., 209
F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (IVA lawyers not "attor-
neys for the government").
Department of Justice Strike Force attorneys may be
authorized to appear in a federal grand jury, even if
appointment is broad in scope. See United States v.
Cravero, 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1100 (1977); United States v. Morrison, 531 F.2d
1089 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 837 (1976); United
States v. Santiago, 528 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 972 (1976); In re Subpoena of Persico, 522 F.2d
41 (2d Cir. 1975).
9 See United States v. Echols, 542 F.2d 948, 951 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 904 (1977); United States
v. Isaacs, 347 F. Supp. 743, 749 (N.D. Ill. 1972); United
States v. Bowdach, 324 F. Supp. 123 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
Mere technical violations of rule 6(d), however, may not
necessitate dismissal. See United States v. Rath, 406 F.2d
757 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969) (accidental
entrance). A witness remaining in the grand jury room to
hear other testimony is grounds for dismissal. See United
States v. Edgerton, 80 F. 374 (D. Mont. 1897). There are
no allowed special exceptions to the rule 6(d) exclusion.
A parent may not accompany a child who is to testify,
and a marshal may not be present in the grand jury room
to control a potentially unruly witness. See United States
v. Borys, 169 F. Supp. 366 (D. Alas. 1959); United Stdtes
v. Carper, 116 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1953).
100 See In re Perlin, 589 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1978) (Com-
modities Future Trading Commission attorney).
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Circuit,'0 ' and a district court in the Ninth Cir-
cuit"0 2 have held that an agency attorney should
not be disqualified if he obtains an appointment
as a special attorney of the Department of Justice
and participates in grand jury proceedings. 03 The
only published opinion to the contrary is a panel
decision from the Sixth Circuit that was reversed




The controversy surrounding agency attorneys
who become special assistant United States attor-
neys stems from the notion that the dual employ-
ment by the Department of Justice and the gov-
ernment agency referring the matter to the De-
partment ofJustice for criminal prosecution creates
a conflict of interest. This conflict of interest, or the
appearance thereof, is contrary to the ABA PROS-
ECUTION STANDARDS' 0 5 and the Code of Professional
Responsibility disciplinary rules.' ° The three
courts rejecting that argument each held that:
101 See United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547 (3d Cir.
1979) (SEC attorney).
'02 United States v. Dondich, 460 F. Supp. 849 (N.D.
Cal. 1978) (SEC attorney).
'03 Such agency attorneys are appointed by the Attor-
ney General as special assistant United States attorneys
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 515(a), 534 (1976). The per-
missibility of appointing special assistant attorneys was
examined and upheld in In re Subpoena of Persico, 522
F.2d 41, 56-60 (2d Cir. 1975). See also United States v.
Wrigley, 520 F.2d 362, 365-67 (8th Cir. 1975).
'0o See In re April 1977 Grand Jury Subpoenas (General
Motors Corp.), 573 F.2d 936 (6th Cir.), appeal dismissed en
banc, 584 F.2d 1366 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 934 (1979)
(IRS attorney).
'(5 Section 1.2 of the ABA PROSECtrION STANDARDS
provides that "[a] prosecutor should avoid the appear-
ance or reality of a conflict of interest with respect to his
official duties. In some instances, as defined in the Code
of Professional Responsibility, his failure to do so will
constitute unprofessional conduct." ABA PROSEcurioN
STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 1.2.
The commentary to that section states further:
A conflict of interest may arise when, for example,
(i) a law partner or other lawyer professionally
associated with the prosecutor or a relative appears
as, or of, counsel for a defendant; (ii) a business
partner or associate or a relative has any interest in
a criminal case, either as a complaining witness, a
party, or as counsel.
Id. § 1.2 commentary.
"o Disciplinary Rule 5- 101 (A) provides: "Except with
the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer
shall not accept employment if the exercise of his profes-
sional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reason-
ably may be affected by his own financial business,
property, or personal interests." ABA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101 (A). See also Disciplinary
Rule 9-101:
(A) A lawyer shall not accept private employment
[A]lthough the prosecutor should not be a profes-
sional associate of defense counsel, there is no conflict
or appearance of conflict in his being professionally
associated with other lawyers interested in the pros-
ecution. The prosecutor of course is himself inter-
ested in the prosecution, but that is not the sort of
interest that creates a conflict.
0 7
As to the second issue, the prosecutor-witness
conflict, the Third Circuit in United States v. Birdman
criticized the practice, but has stated that a prose-
cutor testifying as a grand jury witness does not per
se require dismissal of an indictment. The Birdman
court held that although abuse might be possible
in certain cases, prosecutorial testimony alone is
not sufficient for reversal.ses However, the Birdman
ruling on this point is contrary to district court
decisions in the Fifth' 9 and Seventh u ° Circuits.
The basis for this controversy stems from the
ethical consideration of the ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility which states: "The roles of an
advocate and of a witness are inconsistent; the
function of an advocate is to advance or argue the
cause of another, while that of a witness is to state
facts objectively.""' Those who argue for per se
dismissal assert that the same ethical considerations
that dictate that prosecutors should not be wit-
nesses at the trial of cases in which they act as an
advocate should disqualify them from being wit-
nesses in grand jury proceedings in which they act
as attorneys for the government. The argument is
bolstered by the ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS,
which state that a prosecutor should not attempt
in a matter upon the merits of which he has
acted in a judicial capacity.
(B) A lawyer shall not accept private employment
in a matter in which he had substantial respon-
sibility while he was a public employee.
(C) A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able
to influence improperly or upon irrelevant
grounds any tribunal, legislative body, or pub-
lic official.
Id. DR 9-101 (footnotes omitted).
107 United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 562 (3d
Cir. 1979); In re Perlin, 589 F.2d 260, 265 (7th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Dondich, 460 F. Supp. 849, 856 (N.D.
Cal. 1978).
'08 United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 561-63
(3d Cir. 1979).
'09 United States v. Treadway, 445 F. Supp. 959 (N.D.
Tex. 1978).
"o United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill.
1979); cf United States v. Daneals, 370 F. Supp. 1289
(W.D.N.Y. 1974) (off the record explanatory remarks
made to grand jury by regional selective service counsel
insufficient for dismissal absent a showing of prejudice).




to influence the grand jury in any way that would
not be permissible before a petit jury." 2 The ar-
gument concludes that since the prosecutor's status
as a witness should have disqualified him from
serving as prosecutor before the grand jury on that
matter, his attendance at subsequent grand jury
sessions is unauthorized because witnesses cannot
attend grand jury sessions at which they themselves
are not testifying.
The argument for per se dismissal in the prose-
cutor-witness situation has several flaws. First, one
cannot automatically apply trial standards to
grand jury proceedings. Prosecutors historically,
and with judicial approval, have been allowed to
present material to grand jurors in ways that would
be impermissible at trial. The rules of evidence,
other than those regarding privilege," 3 do not ap-
ply to grand jury proceedings. Hearsay evidence,
for example, is permissible in grand jury proceed-
ings." 4 A grand jury may investigate on the basis
of "tips, rumors, hearsay, speculation or any source
12 The ABA PROSECUTION STANDARD, supra note 8,
§ 3.5(b) states: "The prosecutor should not make state-
ments or arguments in an effort to influence grand jury
action in a manner which would be impermissible at trial
before a petit jury." The commentary to § 3.5 further
provides that: "In general, he [the prosecutor] should be
guided by the standards governing and defining the
proper presentation of the state's case in an adversary
trial before a petit jury." Id. § 3.5 commentary. This
standard and commentary, if read literally, would require
adherence to the rules of evidence in a grand jury pro-
ceeding which is simply not reasonable considering the
grand jury's role in the federal criminal system. It seems
equally unreasonable to adopt a per se rule of dismissal
as did the courts in United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp.
1336 (N.D. I1. 1979), and United States v. Treadway,
445 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
"3See FED. R. EviD. 1101(d)(2). See also Bracy v.
United States, 435 U.S. 1301 (1978)(Rehnquist, J., Cir-
cuit Justice) (the grand jury may receive evidence that
would be inadmissible at trial); United States v. Blue,
384 U.S. 251, 255 n.2 (1966). The grand jury is not
unique. Numerous proceedings affecting defendants'
rights in the federal justice system do not require trial
standards of procedure for the consideration of informa-
tion, e.g., preliminary examinations, probation revoca-
tion, sentencing, and others. See FED R. EvW. 1101(d) (3).
"'4 See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
The grand jurors must not be misled, however, into
thinking they are receiving eyewitness testimony. See
United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408, 410 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); United States v. Estepa, 471
F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Leibowitz, 420
F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1969); c. Coppedge v. United States,
311 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 946
(1963)(reading of transcript of testimony rather than
presenting live witnesses permissible because grand jury
not misled).
of ififormation""' including the grand jurors' per-
sonal knowledge-evidence that would be inad-
missible at trial. Second, it is incongruous to dismiss
an indictment because a prosecutor testified before
the grand jury.11 6 Congress, in defining the powers
and duties of special grand juries, contemplated
that attorneys for the government would inform
grand juries of any information they had received
from third parties." 7 The per se dismissal rule
would lead to an awkward situation. A prosecutor
could fulfill the statutory duty by informally in-
forming the grand jury of information he has re-
ceived from a third party, but if he informed the
grand jury under oath from the witness stand, he
could no longer participate in the proceedings.
This situation would appear to contravene the
congressional intent of the statute requiring prose-
cutors to communicate third-party information to
the grand jury. Moreover, a prosecutor is no more
biased in his statements l" 8 and his office is no more
prestigious" 9 when he takes the witness stand in
the grand jury room and testifies to information he
has received than when he discusses the case with
the grand jury in a session and makes a recommen-
dation to them. 12°
Another argument against per se dismissal is
"5 In re Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 565 F.2d
407, 411 (7th Cir. 1977).
16See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362
(195,6).
n;It shall be the duty of each such grand jury
impaneled within any judicial district to inquire
into offenses against the criminal laws of the United
States alleged to have been committed within that
district. Such alleged offenses may be brought to
the attention of the grand jury by the court or by
any attorney appearing on behalf of the United
States for the presentation of evidence. Any such
attorney receiving information concerning such an
alleged offense from any other person shall, if re-
quested by such other person, inform the grand jury
of such alleged offense, the identity of such other
person, and such attorney's action or recommen-
dation.
18 U.S.C. § 3332(a) (1976).
18 See United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 553-54
(3d Cir. 1979).
1'9 See United States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274, 288 (7th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964 (1972) (rejecting the
"awesome office" theory advanced to preclude the testi-
mony of a government official).
'
2 0 See 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a) (1976). Courts have ap-
proved fair summarization before the grand jury by
prosecutors. See United States v. Litton Sys., 573 F.2d
195, 201 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 828 (1978);
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 238 F.2d 713,
721 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 981 (1957);




that the courts have held that, in the absence of
undue influence, a breach of rule 6(d) does not rise
to a constitutional infirmity vitiating the proceed-
ing and any indictment resulting therefrom. In
Walker v. Estelle' the court held that a court
reporter's presence during grand jury deliberations
was not an infirmity of constitutional proportion
sufficient to void a proceeding absent a showing of
undue influence. Arguably, the rule should be no
different for prosecutors who, if without asserting
undue influence, remain in the grand jury room
after they have testified as witnesses.
12 2
This discussion indicates that the Third Circuit
in United States v. Birdman clearly articulated the
better rule when it held that before an indictment
will be dismissed in a situation where a prosecutor
testified and then remained on the investigation
and participated in grand jury proceedings, the
defendant must show actual prejudice as a result
of the prosecutorial misconduct.'2 3 Regardless of
the showing required for dismissal, the courts agree
that prosecutors should adhere to standards of
professional ethics and either scrupulously avoid
testifying before the grand jury or recuse them-
selves from the investigations in which their testi-
mony is necessary.1
24
12' 525 F.2d 648, 649 (5th Cir. 1976); cf United States
v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604, 606 (2d Cir. 1944) (hold-
ing that the presence of grand jurors, later disqualified
during the taking of testimony was not grounds for
dismissal, decided under former statdte 18 U.S.C.
§ 554(a) (repealed)).
'22 But see United States v. Bowdach, 324 F. Supp. 123,
124 (S.D. Fla. 1971) ("[tlhe potential for undue influence
if that be the test is made greater by the fact that the
unauthorized person... was a government agent who
possessed personal knowledge of the evidence being pre-
sented").
123 See United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 560-61
(3d Cir. 1979). On the testifying prosecutor issue the
Birdman court did not mention United States v. Gold, 470
F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979), and distinguished United
States v. Treadway, 445 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Tex. 1978),
on the basis that there the testifying prosecutor was
needed to prove an essential element of the crime, while
in Birdman he was a summary witness, and in Treadway,
the prosecutor-witness' testimony was inaccurate in sev-
eral respects, while in Birdman there was no allegation of
falsification or distortion. 602 F.2d at 560-61. Although
upholding the indictment, the court in Birdman articu-
lated two sets of circumstances in which preindictment
prosecutorial misconduct would result in an indictment
being dismissed: one, actual prejudice to the defendant
caused by the misconduct and, two, when the improper
prosecutorial practice "has become so entrenched and
flagrant ... as to require a prophylactic rule of dismissal."
Id. at 559-60.
'A United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d at 559-61.
C. THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE AND
PROSECUTORS' COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS
Despite the broad spectrum of permissible infor-
mation a grand jury may utilize, there are limita-
tions on the extent to which prosecutors may ques-
tion witnesses or comment on matters under inves-
tigation. The United States Attorneys' Manual
states these limits in general terms.'25 Although the
federal courts historically have been reluctant to
use their supervisory powers to sanction or even to
investigate alleged prosecutorial misconduct, 2 6 this
reluctance appears to be waning as the courts
increasingly recognize the reliance of federal grand
jurors on the prosecutors who appear before
them' 2 7 and the "necessity to society of an inde-
pendent and informed grand jury."'
28
Where prosecutors willfully have misled the
grand jury 28 or knowingly have presented false
information, 3H the courts usually order dismissal.
25 See note 95 and accompanying text supra. See also
ABA PROSECUTION STANDARD, supra note 8, § 3.5(b) (the
full text of the quotation may be found at note 112 supra).
Disciplinary Rule 7-106(c)(2) provides: "A lawyer shall
not... [ajsk any question that he has no reasonable basis
to believe is relevant to the case and that is intended to
degrade a witness or other person." ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7 -106(c)(2).
126 See, e.g., In re Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 587
F.2d 889, 892 (7th Cir. 1978) (concrete basis supporting
inference of misconduct required before hearing regard-
ing allegations of misconduct will be held); In re Special
February 1975 Grand Jury, 565 F.2d 407, 411 (7th Cir.
1977) (strong showing must be made before court will
interfere with orderly process of grand jury); Ostrer v.
Aronwald, 434 F. Supp. 379, 394-95 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 567
F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1977).
127 See United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 880-
81 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807,
816-17 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d
781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Jacobs,
547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 436 U.S. 31
(1978); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3d
Cir. 1973); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1136
(2d Cir. 1972).
1'28 Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). See
United States v. Leverage Funding Sys., 478 F. Supp.
799, 801 (C.D. Cal. 1979); United States v. Asdurbal-
Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939, 942 (N.D. Ill. 1979); United
States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505, 513 (C.D. Cal.
1975).
'2 See, e.g., United States v. Samango, 450 F. Supp.
1097 (D. Hawaii 1978), aff'd, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.
1979) (indictment dismissed because of prosecutor's will-
ful suppression of favorable testimony). See also United
States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
(indictment dismissed because of prosecutor's failure to
disclose his improper motives for seeking second indict-
ment).
130 See, e.g., United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th
Cir. 1974) (indictment dismissed because of prosecutor's
willful presentation of perjured testimony). But see Lo-
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The federal courts, however, have imposed varying
sanctions in cases in which the prosecutors were
negligent in presenting inaccurate information or
were unaware of the falsity of the information.
Most courts, however, adhere to the standard that
absent evidence that the government attorneys or
agents knowingly or deliberately misled the grand
jury, dismissal of the indictment is not war-
ranted.13' Because the federal courts, in addressing
the issue of grand jury abuse, have typically
weighed evidence demonstrating guilt against the
nature of the prosecutorial misconduct, the deci-
sions establish no consistent standard for dis-
missal. 3 2
raine v. United States, 396 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 933 (1968) (indictment not dismissed
despite prosecutor's willful suppression of evidence un-
dermining credibility of three key witnesses).
131 See United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 622-
25 (2d Cir. 1979) (dismissal required only when grand
jury knowingly or deliberately misled); United States v.
Richman, 600 F.2d 286, 292 (Ist Cir. 1979) (although
government "may have been negligent" in allowing false
testimony to be presented to grand jury, indictment not
dismissed where prosecutor not aware of falsity at the
time of testimony); United States v. Scheufler, 599 F.2d
893, 895-97 (9th Cir. 1979) (absent evidence of perjury
or that prosecutor believed grand jury testimony to be
false, dismissal not required; even assuming impropriety
of testimony, grand jury evidence was "overwhelming"
and sufficient to sustain indictment); United States v.
Cathey, 591 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1979) (false testimony
in grand jury insufficient to require dismissal of indict-
ment absent a showing that perjury had been commit-
ted); United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978) (indictment
should be dismissed "only in a flagrant case, and perhaps
only where knowing perjury, relating to a material matter
has been presented to grand jury"). See generally United
States v. Sullivan, 578 F.2d 121, 124 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 752-53 (2d Cir.
1976); Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128, 131-32
(D.C. Cir. 1962) (if some competent evidence presented
to grand jury, indictment sustained even though other
evidence presented to grand jury was incompetent or
even false). But see United States v. Asdurbal-Herrera,
470 F. Supp. 939, 943 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (indictment dis-
missed even though prosecutor unaware of false testi-
mony); United States v. Sousley, 453 F. Supp. 754, 758
n.1 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (indictment dismissed even though
prosecutor merely negligent in not checking the accuracy
of his comments).
" Compare United States v. Riccobene, 451 F.2d 586,
587 (3d Cir. 1971) (indictment upheld even though pros-
ecutor informed grand jury that a crucial witness would
not testify because he feared the defendants who were
"connected with organized crime and could harm him');
Laughlin v. United States, 385 F.2d 287 (1967) (indict-
ment upheld even though prosecutor referred to grand
jury witness as a prostitute); and United States v. Bruzgo,
373 F.2d 383, 384-87 (3d Cir. 1967) (indictment upheld
However, two recent court of appeals decisions"ss
may evidence a trend in the federal courts favoring
dismissal as a deterrent for prosecutorial miscon-
duct. In United States v. Serubo'm the Third Circuit
reversed the defendants' convictions and remanded
the case for a determination by the district court of
the appropriateness of dismissing the indictment,
firmly warning prosecutors that the sanction of
dismissal should and would be used against them.
We recognize that dismissal of an indictment may
impose important costs upon the prosecution and
the public. At a minimum, the government will be
required to present its evidence to a grand jury
unaffected by bias or prejudice. But the costs of
continued unchecked prosecutorial misconduct are
also substantial. This is particularly so before the
grand jury, where the prosecutor operates without
the check of a judge or a trained legal adversary,
and virtually immune from public scrutiny. The
prosecutor's abuse of his special relationship to the
where the prosecutor called a witness a thief and a
racketeer, which inspired the grand jurors to hiss and
openly threaten him with loss of citizenship and imprison-
ment), with United States v. DiGrazia, 213 F. Supp. 232,
234-35 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (indictment dismissed because
prosecutor used inflammatory language to impugn and
discredit the witness and inflame the grand jurors against
the accused). See also United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313
(9th Cir. 1908) (indictment dismissed where prosecutor
told witness, "Now you know you are lying"; "I will put
the screws to you," and remained in grand jury room
during deliberation and voting); United States v. Whit-
ted, 325 F. Supp. 520 (D. Neb. 1971), rev'dper curiam, 454
F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1972).
"' United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.
1979), affg 450 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Hawaii 1979); United
States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979). The Third
Circuit in Serubo seemed compelled to reconcile its opinion
in United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1979),
handed down just two months before the Serubo decision.
The Birdman court declined to adopt a prophylactic rule
of dismissal for the prosecutorial improprieties presented
there. The Birdman court did imply that a prophylactic
rule of dismissal may be warranted absent a demonstra-
tion of actual prejudice if the conduct "was anything but
an isolated incident unmotivated by sinister ends" or the
conduct was "so entrenched and flagrant" to require such
a sanction. 602 F.2d at 559-61 & n.61. The Serubo opinion
reflects an exasperation with prosecutorial misconduct
not present in prior opinions, and the Serubo court seemed
to go further than Birdman by recognizing that the Second
Circuit had in the past used dismissal as a "remedy to
correct flagrant or persistent abuse." 604 F.2d at 817.
'34 604 F.2d at 818-19. The Serubo court remanded the
case because the misconduct reviewed by the court oc-
curred before the grand jury that conducted the major
portion of the investigation. The indictment had been
returned by a second grand jury, however, and the circuit
court ordered discovery to determine how tainted the
second grand jury was by the conduct before the first.
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grand jury poses an enormous risk to defendants as
well. For while in theory a trial provides the defend-
ant with a full opportunity to contest and disprove
the charges against him, in practice, the handing up
of an indictment will often have a devastating per-
sonal and professional impact that a later dismissal
or acquittal can never undo. Where the potential for
abuse is so great, and the consequences of a mistaken
indictment so serious, the ethical responsibilities of
the prosecutor, and the obligation of the judiciary to
protect against even the appearance of unfairness,
are correspondingly heightened.
We suspect the dismissal of an indictment may
be virtually the only effective way to encourage
compliance with these ethical standards, and to
protect defendants from abuse of the grand july
process.-
The prosecutor in Serubo did the following: (1) he
attempted to link the defendants with organized
crime without laying any evidentiary foundation;
(2) he referred to prior loansharking charges
against persons with whom he was trying to asso-
ciate the defendants and summarized evidence re-
lating to those charges without telling the grand
jury that the defendants had been acquitted; (3)
he impugned the testimony of witnesses who failed
to link defendants with organized crime; (4) he
commented unfavorably on the veracity of wit-
nesses; and (5) he bullied witnesses who were un-
cooperative with him. 36
The district court found the prosecutor's conduct
"generally improper, reprehensible and unaccept-
able,"' 3 7 but denied the motion to dismiss. The
defendants pleaded guilty, conditionally reserving
their right to appeal the district court's denial of
the pretrial motion.'
38
The Third Circuit noted that Serubo was unlike
its two prior decisions' 39 in which the defendants'
claims of prejudice resulting from grand jury abuse
had been rejected because the prior indictments
had been supported by "an abundance of compe-
tent evidence.' ' 140 The Serubo court was outraged by
the prosecutorial conduct presented by the facts
'3 Id. at 817
136 Id. at 815.
137 United States v. Serubo, 460 F. Supp. 689, 700-01
(1978).
" For cases approving this procedure, see United
States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 848, 851-52 (3d Cir.
1975).
13 United States v. Riccobene, 451 F.2d 586 (3d Cir.
1971); United States v. Bruzgo, 373 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.
1967).
140 United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 816-17 (3d
Cir. 1979).
before it, but recognized that, since the offensive
activity had taken place primarily before a grand
jury which did not return the indictment and since
it had not been shown that the misconduct infected
the grand jury which did return the indictment, it
was possible for the indictment to survive. There-
fore, the court remanded the matter to the district
court for a determination on that point.' 4'
The Serubo decision, as expansive as it is, has
been criticized for failing to create a mechanism
whereby grand jury abuse can be discovered and
for failing to dismiss with prejudice in a case in
which the grand jury had been infected with the
impropriety. 4 2 The second criticism fails to recog-
nize that dismissal of an indictment with prejudice
is an extreme sanction which the federal courts are
reluctant to impose. 43 Although rare, it is possible,
however, that outrageous government misconduct
could taint the evidence or prejudice the defendant
so as to preclude the superseding charge.' 44 How-
ever, questioning witnesses in a harassing manner
or prejudicing a grand jury with comments unsup-
ported by the record is curable by recalling the
witnesses before a second grand jury and obtaining
the same testimony minus the prosecutorial impro-
priety.
The first criticism of Serubo is a valid criticism of
the criminal discovery system in general, but is
particularly appropriate in the area of prosecuto-
rial misconduct. In Serubo the government provided
the defendants the transcripts revealing the prose-
cutorial misconduct under the doctrine of Brady v.
Maryland.14'5 Indeed, the only way defendants are
legally allowed to examine grand jury transcripts
is if those transcripts contain information favorable
to the defendant and are turned over under the
Brady doctrine or under 18 U.S.C. § 3500.46 If the
grand jury transcripts in Serubo had not contained
141 This remand in Serubo reflects the general attitude
of the federal courts to allow reindictment upon dismissal
if the superseding indictment is the product of grand jury
proceedings that are free of impropriety. See United States
v. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939, 943 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
142 See Makdon & Brier, Prosecutorial Misconduct: Bark
Bigger than Bite, LEGAL TIMES OF WASHINGTON 12-13 (Oct.
29, 1979).
143 See United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852,
865 (5th Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Baskes, 433
F. Supp. 799, 804-07 (N.D. II1. 1977).
'" See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,431-
32 (1973). See also United States v. Acosta, 526 F.2d 670,
674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 920 (1976).
145 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
146 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). The statute requires the
government to disclose to the defense any grand jury
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testimony of witnesses favorable to the defendants,
they would not have been discoverable. Although
all comments by the prosecutor to the grand jurors
during grandjury sessions now must be recorded,'47
the defendant or his lawyer may never discover
recorded inflammatory or prejudicial comments
because the transcript may never be revealed dur-
ing pretrial discovery.
In United States v. Samango,148 the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of a supersed-
ing indictment. 45 In so doing, the court distin-
guished its earlier opinion in United States v. Cha-
hen I50 in which it had reversed a district court's
dismissal of an indictment for prosecutorial mis-
conduct. The court in Samango described the facts
before it as "superficially similar"'' to those in
Chanen.
Both Samango and Chanen involved three separate
grand juries and two indictments. The second in-
dictment in both cases was based solely on hearsay
evidence. In both cases the testimony of the wit-
nesses before the previous grand juries was pre-
sented by government personnel to the indicting
grand jury. In Chanen the government failed to
present the transcript of a previous grand jury
witness whose testimony was "deemed unhelpful"
by the government.
152
The distinctions between Samango and Chanen
upon which their opposite conclusions turned were:
first, that in Chanen the agent read the previous
grand jury transcripts to the indicting jury and in
Samango the prosecutor left the transcripts with the
grand jurors so the jurors could read the transcripts
transcript or statement of any government witness after
the witness has testified on direct examination at trial. In
reality, the disclosure of such statements is typically made
before the witness' direct examination to avoid delay in
the trial. See generally United States v. Campagnuolo, 592
F.2d 852, 858 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Murphy, 569 F.2d 771, 774 n.10 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 955 (1978).
147 FED. R. CGaM. P. 6(c)(1).
'48 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979).
"9 United States v. Samango, 450 F. Supp. 1097 (D.
Hawaii 1978).
'5 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825
(1977).
'5' 607 F.2d at 881.
'2549 F.2d at 1308 n.l. Although not specifically
discussed, the failure to present this "unhelpful" testi-
mony was apparently excused by the Chanen court as a
legitimate prosecutorial act "to screen out unreliable
witnesses." Id. at 1311. The Samango court criticized the
prosecutor for submitting the previous grand jury testi-
mony of the defendant Samango as "'calculated preju-
dice."' 607 F.2d at 883 (quoting the lower court opinion,
450 F. Supp. at 1106).
themselves; "3 second, in Chanen the transcripts had
revealed that some of the witnesses had previously
filed false affidavits and the prosecutor had advised
the grand jurors that some of the witnesses whose
transcripts were read by the agent had given in-
consistent statements. The Chanen court found this
to be sufficient to apprise the grand jury of the
credibility problem,'5  whereas the Samango court
held that a witness, Granat, whose credibility was
subject to question, had to be presented live
"thereby enabling the grand jury to observe [his]
demeanor and determine on its own whether
Granat was a credible witness. ' 155
In sum, close analysis reveals that the Samango
and Chanen facts are not as distinguishable as the
Ninth Circuit presented them to be. Perhaps the
reason that the court attempted to distinguish the
two cases is that although the court felt compelled
to exercise its supervisory powers to deter prosecu-
torial misconduct, it did not wish to inspire the
unlimited range of allegations of misconduct of
which it spoke in Chanen.
15
D. RECORDING OF PROCEEDINGS
The ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS have always
advised that "[t]he prosecutor's communications
and presentations to the grand jury should be on
the record."1 57 Historically, the federal courts
maintained that recording of federal grand jury
proceedings was not mandatory.s Because of this,
'53 607 F.2d at 881.
'-4 549 F.2d at 1311. There is no indication in the
Chanen opinion whether the prosecutor actually explained
the nature or extent of the witnesses' inconsistencies. In
Samango the prosecutor's and agents' comments about the
cooperation and credibility of the witnesses were consid-
ered to be a part of the "cumulative effect" requiring
dismissal. 607 F.2d at 884. In any event, the Chanen court
did not articulate any prosecutorial obligation to present
these witnesses live so the grand jurors could assess their
credibility.
-5s 607 F.2d at 882.
'6 549 F.2d at 1309 ("The range of prosecutorial
conduct capable of inspiring allegations of unfairness
appears unlimited.').
7 See ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 3.5
(c) (Tentative Draft 1971).
Mss See United States v. Siegel, 587 F.2d 721, 728 (5th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Head, 586 F.2d 508, 511 (5th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Aloisio, 440 F.2d 705, 708
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971). Although only
one published federal decision has held that the failure
to record matters occurring before the grand jury was an
independent ground invalidating an indictment, United
States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 579 (W.D.
Tex. 1977), the courts have recognized that recording all
of proceedings, including prosecutors' comments, is the
better practice. See, e.g., United States v. Peden, 472 F.2d
19801
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it was common practice for the court reporter not
to record the prosecutor's comments or the com-
ments of the grand jurors at a federal grand jury
session when no witness was present.1 59 This prac-
tice is no longer permissible because effective Au-
gust 1, 1979, rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure was amended to require the
recording of all grand jury proceedings except
deliberating or voting.'r° The proviso in rule 6(e)(1)
that "[a]n unintentional failure" to record shall not
"affect the validity of the prosecution" carries with
it the inference that an intentional failure to record
583, 584 (2d Cir. 1973). Some district courts by rule
provide for the attendance of court reporters at all grand
jury sessions and for the recording of all testimony of
witnesses appearing. See, e.g., LOCAL CRIM. RULES OF THE
NORTHERN DIsT. OF ILL. 1.04(c).
159 Historically, the practice of nonrecordation was
done to allow discussion among the jurors between wit-
nesses' appearances. Presumably, such informal discus-
sions among jurors are not "proceedings" of the grand
jury. Now with the amendment to rule 6(e), FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e), requiring the recording of "all proceedings
except deliberating and voting," the question arises as to
whether such discussions are proceedings that must be
recorded. Such discussions could fall into the "deliberat-
ing" exception to the recording requirement. Prosecutors
and the grand jury court reporter are pursuant to rule
6(d), FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d), not authorized to be present
at such deliberations. The outcome of the question will
probably be that the court reporter will record all pro-
ceedings at which a prosecutor is present in the room. An
argument could be made at least as to federal grand
juries in the Northern District of Illinois that the proviso
in local criminal rule 1.04(F) imposes a recording require-
ment of discussions between prosecutors and the grand
jurors even prior to the effective date of the rule 6(e)
amendment. The rule states in part:
Nothing in this order shall prohibit members of a
Grand Jury from discussing, prior to deliberating
on a matter, the evidence, testimony, and applicable
law with the United States Attorney, Assistant
United States Attorneys, or other Government
counsel authorized to be before the Grand Jury,
provided that such discussions are held during recorded
sessions of the GrandJury.
LOCAL CRIM. RULES OF THE NORTHERN DIsT. OF ILL.
1.04(F) (emphasis added).
160 The amendment to rule 6(e), effective Aug. 1, 1979,
states:
(1) Recording of Proceedings. All proceedings, ex-
cept when the grand jury is deliberating or voting
shall be recorded stenographically or by an elec-
tronic recording device. An unintentional failure of
any recording to reproduce all or any portion of a
proceeding shall not affect the validity of the pros-
ecution. The recording or reporter's notes or any
transcript prepared therefrom shall remain in the
custody or control of the attorney for the govern-
ment unless otherwise ordered in a particular case.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
will affect the prosecution. This issue has not been
addressed thus far in any published decision. Since
the only sanction rule 6(e) mentions is contempt of
court,161 a court could interpret that remedy as the
sole remedy, thus preventing dismissal of an in-
dictment even if an intentional failure to record
occurred. The more probable interpretation is that
the use of the words "may be punished as a con-
tempt of court" in rule 6(e)(2) does not preclude
dismissal of an indictment should the circum-
stances of the rule 6 violation warrant such action.
Whatever sanction the court decides to impose,
it can do so only if the intentional failure to record
is brought to its attention. Historically, however,
the discovery of grand jury material has been
allowed only upon showing of "particularized
need.' 162 Under that standard a defendant is
placed in the untenable situation of having to show
prosecutorial impropriety before he is entitled to
review the material with which he may be able to
show prosecutorial impropriety. A mere allegation
of impropriety is insufficient to lift the curtain of
grand jury secrecy under the present posture of the
law.163
Courts, on occasion, have questioned the strict
need for secrecy. 164 The traditional reasons for
maintaining secrecy, such as protection of witnesses
and innocent parties, do not apply when it is the
prosecutor's comments that are sought after return
of the indictment. If deterrence of prosecutorial
abuse and protection of a defendant's right to an
independent unbiased grand jury are the reasons
for the amendment set forth in rule 6(e)(1), those
goals can only be effectively reached when the
161 Rule 6(e)(2) states in part that "[a] knowing viola-
tion of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
162 See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 868-75
(1966); United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 662 (2d
Cir. 1978).
l"See In re Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 565
F.2d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 1977) ("a mere assertion [of
impropriety by government attorneys] is not enough to
call for an evidentiary and further inquiry"). See also
United States v. Fife, 573 F.2d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Greenberg, 204 F. Supp. 400, 402
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
" See United States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654, 668
(9th Cir. 1970) (the court stated: "I have never been able
to accept the proposition that while extensive discovery
promotes the cause of justice in civil controversies, any
right to discovery on the part of a defendant in a criminal
case must be severely curtailed."); United States v. Duffy,
54 F.R.D. 549 (N.D. Ill. 1972); United States v. Tanner,
279 F. Supp. 457, 472 (N.D. Il. 1967) ("trial court has
the inherent power and unmitigated duty to lift the lid
of secrecy in order to insure that justice will be done').
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defendant is apprised of what the prosecutor did
and said before the grand jury. Since a prosecutor's
comments in grand jury proceedings are now re-
quired to be recorded, courts have no reason to
withhold those comments from the defendant in-




The federal courts, t65 including the Supreme
Court,5 66 have consistently recognized that the sub-
poena power of grand juries includes the power to
compel the attendance of a putative defendant.
While recognizing the power to compel the at-
tendance of a "target,"'167 the United States Attor-
neys' Manual states:
[I]n the context of particular cases such a subpoena
may carry the appearance of unfairness. Because the
potential for misunderstanding is great, before a
known "target" ... is subpoenaed to testify before
the grand jury about his involvement in the crime
under investigation, an effort should be made to
secure his voluntary appearance. If his voluntary
appearance cannot be obtained, he should be sub-
poenaed only after the grand jury and U.S. Attorney
or the responsible Assistant Attorney General have
approved the subpoena. In determining whether to
approve a subpoena for a "target", careful attention
16s See, e.g., United States v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218,
1223 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); United
States v. Doe, 457 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 941 (1973); United States v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114,
120-21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971).
6sSee, e.g., United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181
(1977); United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 179 n.8
(1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 584
n.9 (1976).
167 In practice the words "target" and "subject" of the
investigation are used interchangeably by both prosecu-
tors and defense lawyers. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual
draws a distinction, stating:
A "subject" of an investigation is a person whose
conduct is within the scope of the grand jury's
investigation. A "target" is a person as to whom the
prosecutor or the grand jury has substantial evi-
dence linking him to the commission of a crime and
who, in thejudgment of the prosecutor, is a putative
defendant.
U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 10, § 9-11.250 (Aug.
17, 1978). In a further refinement of these terms, the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual states:
An officer or employee of an organization which is
a target is not automatically to be considered as a
target even if such officer's or employee's conduct
contributed to the commission of the crime by the
target organization, and the same lack of automatic
target status holds true for organizations which
employ, or employed, an officer or employee who is
a target.
Id. § 9-11.250 (Jan. 24, 1979).
will be paid to the following considerations: 1) the
importance to the successful conduct of the grand
jury's investigation of his testimony or other infor-
mation sought; 2) whether the substance of his tes-
timony or other information sought could be pro-
vided by other witnesses; 3) whether the questions
the prosecutor and the grand jurors intend to ask or
the other information sought would be protected by
a valid claim of privilege.1'
s
The ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, section 3.6,
contain two subsections relating to this issue:
(d) If the prosecutor believes that a witness is a
potential defendant he should not seek to compel his
testimony before the grand jury without informing
him that he may be charged and that he should seek
independent legal advice concerning his rights.
(e) The prosecutor should not compel the appear-
ance of a witness before the grand jury whose activ-
ities are the subject of the inquiry if the witness
states that if called he will exercise his constitutional
privilege not to testify, unless [the] prosecutor in-
tends to seek a grant of immunity according to
law.
69
As with other prosecutorial powers, federal
courts are sensitive to the prejudicial effect of a
putative defendant's appearance before the grand
jury. In determining the extent to which prosecu-
tors may exercise the power to compel a "target"
to appear, the courts have looked to the prosecu-
tor's motivation in seeking that appearance. Fed-
eral courts have held that the prosecutor commits
an impropriety only if his sole purpose in subpoena-
ing a "target" before the grand jury is to force the
target to claim his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination in front of the grand
jury170 or to induce the prospective defendant to
commit perjury.1
7 '
The courts have not found any impropriety
when prosecutors call a "target" to testify knowing
that he will "take the fifth," but several courts have
68Id. § 9-11.251 (Aug. 17, 1978).
169 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 3.6.
17
0 See United States v. Fortunato, 402 F.2d 79, 82 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 933 (1969); United States
v. Horowitz, 452 F. Supp. 415, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See
also United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965).
171 See, e.g., Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059,
1079-80 (9th Cir. 1972); Brown v. United States, 245
F.2d 549, 554-55 (8th Cir. 1957). See also United States
v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383, 388 (D.D.C. 1956). The
burden is on the defendant to establish the prosecutor's
improper motive. See United States v. Nickels, 502 F.2d
1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911
(1976); United States v. Devitt, 499 F.2d 135, 140 (7th
Cir. 1974).
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suggested that it would be a better practice for a
prosecutor to inform the grand jury that no adverse
inference can be drawn from a witness' invocation
of his fifth amendment right. The U.S. Attor-
neys' Manual goes even further than the courts by
stating that:
[I]f a target of the investigation ... and his attorney
state in a writing signed by both that the "target"
will refuse to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds,
the witness ordinarily should be excused from testi-
fying unless the grand jury and the U.S. Attorney
agree to insist on the appearance. In determining
the desirability of insisting on the appearance of
such a person, consideration should be given to the
factors which justified the subpoena in the first place,
i.e., the importance of the testimony or other infor-
mation sought, its unavailability from other sources,
and the applicability of the Fifth Amendment to the
likely areas of inquiry.' 73
F. RIGHT OF PUTATIVE DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY OR
PRESENT EVIDENCE
The United States Attorneys' Manual gives a
general outline as to when a putative defendant
should be permitted to testify or present evidence.
[U]nder normal circumstances, where no burden
upon the grand jury or delay of its proceedings is
involved, reasonable requests by a "subject" or "tar-
get" of an investigation ... personally to testify
before the grand jury ordinarily should be given
favorable consideration, provided that such witness
explicitly waives his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and is represented by counsel or voluntarily
and knowingly appears without counsel and con-
sents to full examination under oath.
174
The ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS are silent on
the topic.
The federal courts have consistently held that
prosecutors are not obliged to grant the request of
a potential defendant to present evidence to a
grand jury.'7 5 The United States Attorneys' Man-
',- See, e.g., United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779,
785 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969);
United States v. Horowitz, 452 F. Supp. 415, 418
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
'73 U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 10, § 9-11.254
(Aug. 17, 1978).
14 Id. at § 9-11.252 (citations omitted).
'
75 See United States v. Salsedo, 607 F.2d 318, 319 (9th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Donahey, 529 F.2d 831, 832
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976); United States
v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 861 (1976); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Berk-
ley & Co.), 466 F. Supp. 863, 867 (D. Minn. 1979);
United States v. Kernodle, 367 F. Supp. 844, 854
(M.D.N.C. 1973), affld, 506 F.2d 1398 (4th Cir. 1974).
ual, however, not only recommends that such re-
quests be granted, but encourages prosecutors to
notify "targets" to afford them an opportunity to
testify. 176 Since the United States Attorneys' Man-
ual creates no substantive rights and such notifi-
cation is not constitutionally or statutorally re-
quired, a prosecutor's failure to afford a potential
defendant the opportunity to testify is not grounds




If a prospective defendant appears before a
grand jury, the question arises as to what he should
be told by the federal prosecutor in order to ensure
that his rights are not violated. The Supreme Court
has specifically ruled that a prosecutor has no
constitutional obligation to apprise a putative de-
fendant of his "target" status when he is called to
testify before the grand jury.'78 But the Supreme
Court has declined to rule on the question of
whether a "target" must be warned of his fifth
amendment right to refuse to answer questions that
call for the disclosure of self-incriminating infor-
mation.' 79 As a result this issue remains an open
question.'s
°
'76 U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 10, § 9-11.253
states:
Where a target is not called to testify pursuant to 9-
11.251 ... and does not request to testify on his own
motion ..., the prosecutor, in appropriate cases, is
encouraged to notify such person a reasonable time
before seeking an indictment in order to afford him
an opportunity to testify (subject to the conditions
set forth in 9-11.252 ...) before the grand jury. Of
course, notification would not be appropriate in
routine clear cases nor where such action might
jeopardize the investigation or prosecution because
of the likelihood of flight, destruction or fabrication
of evidence, endangerment of other witnesses, undue
delay or otherwise would be inconsistent with the
ends of justice.
1
7 7 See United States v. Shulman, 466 F. Supp. 293
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); note 12 & accompanying text supra.
' United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 189
(1977) ("[b]ecause target witness status neither enlarges
nor diminishes the constitutional protection against com-
pelled self-incrimination, potential-defendant warnings
add nothing of value to protection of Fifth Amendment
rights"). But see United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 1031 (1978). InJacobs
the Second Circuit exercised its supervisory power to
require that notice be given to targets of their status
where it had been a long standing practice in the circuit
for prosecutors to give such warnings. See also United
States v. Crocker, 568 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir. 1977).
'79 See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186,
190-91 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S.
564, 582 n.7 (1976).
'80 In Mandujano, the Supreme Court observed that
federal prosecutors customarily warn "targets" of their
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The U.S. Attorneys' Manual states:
Notwithstanding the lack of a clear constitutional
imperative, it is the internal policy of the Depart-
ment to advise grand jury witnesses of the following
matters: 1) the general subject matter of the grand
jury's inquiry (to the extent that such disclosure does
not compromise the progress of the investigation or
otherwise inimically affect the administration ofjus-
tice; 2) that the witness may refuse to answer any
question if a truthful answer to the question would
tend to incriminate him; 3) that anything that the
witness does say may be used against him; and 4)
that the grand jury will permit the witness the
reasonable opportunity to step outside the grand
jury room to consult with counsel if he desires. This
notification will be contained on a printed form (to
be provided by the Department) which will be ap-
pended to all grand jury subpoenas. In addition,
these "warnings" should be given by the prosecutor
on the record before the grand jury when necessary
and appropriate (e.g., when witness has not been
subpoenaed), and the witness should be asked to
affirm that the witness understands them.
181
H. THE DUTY TO PRESENT FAVORABLE EVIDENCE
TO THE GRAND JURY
Since a putative defendant has no right to pre-
sent exculpatory evidence to the grand jury,182 the
burden of presenting such evidence falls on the
fifth amendment rights before questioning begins. 425
U.S. at 582 n.7. Also, in Washington, the Court noted that
the administering of warnings at the outset of questioning
in the grand jury negates the possibility of compelled self-
incrimination that might otherwise exist. 431 U.S. at 188.
18 U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 10, § 9-11.250
(Aug. 17, 1978). The printed form of warnings recom-
mended by the Department of Justice to which this
section of the United States Attorneys' Manual refers was
circulated to holders of that Manual in a memorandum
dated March 15, 1979, from Phillip B. Heymann, Assist-
ant Attorney General, Criminal Division. The form is as
follows:
Advice of Rights
1. The Grand Jury is conducting an investigation
of possible violations of Federal criminal laws
involving:
(State here the general subject matter of the
inquiry, e.g., the conducting of an illegal gam-
bling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1955.)
2. You may refuse to answer any question if a
truthful answer to the question would tend to
incriminate you.
3. Anything that you do say may be used against
you by the Grand Jury or in a subsequent legal
proceeding.
4. If you have retained counsel, the Grand Jury will
permit you a reasonable opportunity to step
outside the grand jury room to consult with
counsel if you so desire.
Id. § 9-11.250 (March 15, 1979).
1
8 2 See note 175 supra.
prosecutor conducting the proceeding. 183 This pro-
secutorial obligation stems from the fifth amend-
ment notion of a defendant's right to "an indepen-
dent and informed grand jury. ''l A motion prem-
ised upon a prosecutor's failure to fulfill that obli-
gation is not a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence presented to the grand jury but a chal-
lenge of the conduct of the prosecutor in presenting
it.185
The ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS state only
that "[t]he prosecutor should disclose to the grand
jury any evidence which he knows will tend to
negate guilt."' 85 The United States Attorneys'
Manual, which is more specific, states that:
Although neither statutory nor case law imposes
upon the prosecutor a legal obligation to present
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury... it is the
Department's internal policy to do so under many
circumstances. For example, when a prosecutor con-
ducting a grand jury inquiry is personally aware of
substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt
of a subject of the investigation, the prosecutor must
present or otherwise disclose such evidence to the
grand jury before seeking an indictment against such
a person.'
8
Although the United States Attorneys' Manual
properly recognizes the duty to present exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury, it incorrectly notes that
case law does not impose that duty. Several federal
court decisions have required disclosure to the
grand jury, 8 8 including United States v. Phillips Pe-
18
3 See Comment, The Prosecutor's Duty to Present Excul-
patory Evidence to an Indicting Grand Jury, 75 MICH. L. REV.
1514 (1977).
'84 See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1970).
185 See United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 880
n.6 (9th Cir. 1979).
186ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 3.6
(b).
187 U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 10, § 9-11.334
(Aug. 17, 1978) (citations omitted).
' See, e.g., United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616,
623 (2d Cir. 1979) ("where a prosecutor is aware of any
substantial evidence negating guilt he should, in the
interest of justice, make it known to the grand jury, at
least where it might reasonably be expected to lead the
jury not to indict"); United States v. Olin Corp., 465 F.
Supp. 1120, 1127 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[a] prosecutor has
a duty to present to a grand jury evidence which clearly
negates guilt"); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp.
1033, 1040 (D. Md. 1976) ("'the prosecutor should be
obliged to present evidence to the grand jury that is
favorable to the prospective defendant"') (quoting M.
Frankel & G. Naftalis, The Grand Jury, The New Leader,
Nov. 10, 1975, at 22); cf. United States v. Guillette, 547
F.2d 743, 753 (2d Cir. 1976) (no obligation to notify grand
jury of subsequent acts which would cast doubt on cred-
ibility of evidence underlying indictment); United States
v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 338-39 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
1980]
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troleum Co.lss and United States v. Provenzano,9 ° in
which indictments were dismissed for the prosecu-
tors' failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury.
In Phillips Petroleum the prosecutor continued to
question a grand jury witness, before a court re-
porter, after the grand jury had been excused for
the evening. During this evening session, the wit-
ness was able to explain in a manner that was
exculpatory some incriminating testimony he had
given before the grand jury. The prosecutor never
revealed the exculpatory testimony to the grand
jury. The court dismissed the indictment stating
that "the failure to provide the evening testimony
to the Grand Jurors was also a serious breach of
the defendants' right to due process of law."'
91
In Provenzano the only witness who identified the
defendant as being involved in the charged crime
expressed doubts to the prosecutor about the valid-
ity of this identification. The prosecutor never
revealed the witness' doubts to the grand jury. The
court, citing Phillips Petroleum, dismissed the indict-
ment stating: "In this concededly one-witness iden-
tification case, this disregard for further facts bear-
ing on the viability of the prosecution's case de-
prived the Grand Jury of an opportunity to eval-
uate all the evidence in determining whether to
return an indictment. ' ' lH
In both Phillips Petroleum and Provenzano the pros-
ecutors were personally aware of the favorable
evidence that was withheld from the grand jury.
Thus, the courts were not attempting to impose a
duty on prosecutors to search for favorable evi-
dence.19 3 If the government is not aware of excul-
denied, 423 U.S. 861 (1976)(government need not "pro-
duce evidence that undermined the credibility of its
witnesses"). But see United States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765,
768 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[t]he prosecution was not required
to present the grand jury with evidence which would
tend to negate guilt"); United States v. Y. Hata & Co.,
535 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828
(1976) ("[wle reject appellants' contention that the pros-
ecution must present the grand jury with evidence it may
have which would tend to negate guilt"). See also United
States v. Thompson, 576 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Smith, 552 F.2d 257, 262 (8th Cir. 1977); United
States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
United States v. International Paper Co., 457 F. Supp.
571 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (prosecutors have no obligation to
present everything that could be considered exculpatory).
'9 435 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Okla. 1977).
19'440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also United
States v. Samango, 450 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Hawaii 1978),
aff'd, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979).
19'435 F. Supp. at 620.
192 440 F. Supp. at 566.
"9 See United States v. Ruyle, 524 F.2d 1133, 1135-36
patory material, it cannot be held to have im-
properly withheld it from the grand jury.
9 4
The courts that impose an obligation on prose-
cutors to present exculpatory evidence of which
they are aware represent the better view. Where a
prosecutor has breached this obligation, dismissal
is warranted.' 95
The determination of materiality of a breach of
a prosecutor's duty to disclose favorable evidence
is different in the grand jury context than it is after
a criminal charge has been brought because the
standard of proof required is different. 19 The
grand jury standard is probable cause, and at trial
it is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The exis-
tence of a probability that a crime was committed
by a putative defendant is much less easily removed
than a reasonable doubt raised as to a defendant's
guilt. Thus, the quantum of suppressed evidence
required for remedial court action is greater at the
grand jury level. Regardless of the magnitude of
evidence required to create a grand jury violation,
the prosecutorial obligation to present exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury should be fulfilled.
I. REQUIREMENT THAT PROSECUTORS MAINTAIN
GRAND JURY SECRECY
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized
that the proper functioning of the grand jury sys-
tem depends upon the secrecy of grand jury pro-
ceedings.197 Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Crim-
(6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); Loraine
v. United States, 396 F.2d 335 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 933 (1968).
194 The prosecutor's personal lack of knowledge of
exculpatory evidence may not relieve the duty if his
investigative agents were aware of such evidence. See
People v. Trolia, 69 Ill. App. 3d 439, 388 N.E.2d 35
(1979).
195 Dismissal will, of course, not end the matter. The
government is free to reindict in a proceeding devoid of
impropriety. But if the grand jury, with knowledge of the
exculpatory evidence, reindicts, the defendant has been
accorded his fifth amendment right to "an independent
and informed grand jury." Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
375, 390 (1962).
19 See generally Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348,
362-64 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
197 See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441
U.S. 211, 219 n.10 (1979); United States v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6. (1958). The stated
reasons for secrecy were summarized in United States v.
Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954):
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment
may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost free-
dom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to
prevent persons subject to indictment or other
friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to
(Vol. 71
PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT
inal Procedure imposes the requirement of secrecy
upon prosecutors, government personnel assisting
them, the grand jurors, and court reporters in
attendance at such proceedings.198 However, wit-
nesses appearing before a grand jury have no ob-
ligation to keep secret what occurred in their pres-
ence. 99 The cloak of secrecy does protect testimony
and documents and other physical evidence pro-
duced under subpoena duces tecum. However, the
secrecy of the grand jury is not breached if the
disclosed documents are sought for their intrinsic




A defendant moving to dismiss an indictment
based upon a breach of grand jury secrecy must
overcome the presumption of regularity that is
accorded to governmental activities.20 1 To over-
prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with
the witnesses who may testify before the grand jury
and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it;
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures
by persons who have information with respect to
the commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent
accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the
fact that he has been under investigation, and from
the expense of standing trial where there was no
probability of guilt.
Id. at 628-29.
193 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 (e) (2).
'9See In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand
Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 607 n. I I (D.C. Cir. 1976); In re Grand
Jury Witness Subpoenas, 370 F. Supp. 1282, 1285 n.5
(S.D. Fla. 1974); In re Alvarez, 351 F. Supp. 1089, 1091
(S.D. Cal. 1972); In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 572 (C.D.
Cal.), af/'d, 448 F.2d 369 (1971); In re Grand Jury Sum-
moned October 12, 1970, 321 F. Supp. 238, 239 (N.D.
Ohio 1970) (government attorney may not require a
witness to report back to the grand jury as to conversa-
tions witness has with others.)
2o0 See United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285 (7th"
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979); United States
v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.
1960) (ICC granted access to grand jury documents over
objection of company producing records because records
sought for intrinsic value not what occurred in grand
jury). But see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 210 F. Supp.
904 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also United States v. Armco
Steel Corp., 458 F.2d 784 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Capital
Indemnity Corp. v. First Minn. Constr. Co., 405 F. Supp.
929 (D. Mass. 1975).
2" See United States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.
Pa. 1977); United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239,
1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Addonizio, 313
F. Supp. 486, 495 (D.N.J. 1970), aftd, 451 F.2d 49 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972); United States
v. Kahaner, 204 F. Supp. 921, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See
also United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp.1033, 1053-64
(D. Md. 1976) (burden is high to overcome presumption
of regularity, to avoid automatic dismissal of indictments
involving public figures, and to respect the latitude tra-
ditionally accorded grand juries).
come that presumption, a defendant must dem-
onstrate either that the breach caused an unau-
thorized disclosure that prejudiced him and ad-
versely affected his rights202 or that the breach
generated publicity that prejudiced the grand ju-
rors in their deliberations and deprived the defend-
ant of a fair consideration.
20 3
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Abbott Laboratories'°
4
demonstrates the difficulty of prevailing on a mo-
tion to dismiss based on prejudicial preindictment
publicity. The district court determined that cer-
tain news stories, some inspired by Department of
Justice personnel, were highly inflammatory and
prejudicial, but held that the situation did not
warrant a dismissal of the indictment. 2 5 The court
stated that:
No case of which we are aware, nor any to which
we have been referred, holds that, without resort to
the traditional means of effective protection of a
defendant's right to a fair trial, i.e., voir dire, change
of venue, continuance, pretrial publicity has been so
inflammatory and prejudicial that a fair trial is
absolutely precluded and an indictment should be
dismissed without an initial attempt, by the use of
one or more of the procedures mentioned, to see if
an impartial jury can be impanelled.2°
Nonetheless, prosecutors, in the proper exercise of
their duties, should refrain from disclosing any
information about matters pending before a grand
m See United States v. Thomas, 593 F.2d 615, 623 (5th
Cir. 1979); In re Special March 1974 Grand Jury, 541
F.2d 166, 170-72 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929
(1977); In re April 1956 Term GrandJury (Shotwell), 239
F.2d 263, 270-71 (7th Cir. 1956). Pursuant to rule 6(e),
disclosure to government personnel for the purpose of
assisting government attorneys in criminal investigations
is permissible. See United States v. Evans, 526 F.2d 701
(5th Cir. 1976). See also In re William H. Pflavmer & Sons,
53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
M See In re Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 587 F.2d
889 (7th Cir. 1978); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641
(Ist Cir. 1963), aff/den banc, 336 F.2d 211 (1st Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 971 (1965); United States v. Abra-
hams, 466 F. Supp. 552 (D. Mass. 1978); United States
v. Tallant, 407 F. Supp. 878, 889 (N.D. Ga. 1975); United
States v. Anzelmo, 319 F. Supp. 1106, 1113-14 (E.D. La.
1970); United States v. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. 1148, 1153
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 441 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 932 (1971) (the court suggested that the burden
of proving that preindictment publicity alone prejudiced
the grand jury's work is "probably unmanageable");
United States v. Kahaner, 204 F. Supp. 921, 922
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
24505 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
990 (1975).




jury beyond that necessary for the performance of
their official duties.
J. SUBMISSION OF THE PROPOSED INDICTMENT TO THE
GRAND JURY
Before an indictment can be filed in a United
States District Court, both the grand jury and the
United States attorney must agree on the charges
to be brought. Therefore, after a grand jury has
completed its investigation, the prosecutor prepares
and submits a proposed indictment of charges
which the grand jury can approve or disapprove.
The United States attorney must then sign the
indictment, for without his signature the indict-
ment cannot properly be filed with a court.
There is a split in the district courts over whether
presenting a signed proposed indictment unfairly
influences the grand jurors during deliberations
and voting. The court in United States v. Gold2 held
that it did. The weight of authority supports the
view that submitting a signed indictment is not by
itself improper.2°
It seems highly unlikely that the United States
attorney's signature would be an influential factor
in the grand jury's decision to indict. It is difficult
to imagine how a grand jury which has heard the
evidence and the prosecutor's summary and rec-
ommendation and, thereby, knowing the prosecu-
tor's position on the matter, would be so swayed
by the fact that it has in its possession a signed, as
opposed to an unsigned, copy of the indictment
that it would lose sight of its role to act as an
independent and informed buffer between the ac-
cuser and the accused.
The requirement that the grand jury fulfill its
role as an independent and informed buffer addi-
tionally means that at least twelve grand jurors
who vote to return the indictment must have been
present to hear all the evidence presented by the
prosecutors relating to the indictment.
210
VI. OUTSIDE THE GRAND JURY ROOM
A. INTERFERENCE WITH DEFENSE INVESTIGATION
The ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS state: "A
prosecutor should not discourage or obstruct com-
207 FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
20 .470 F. Supp. 1336, 1354 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
2m See United States v. Levine, 457 F.2d 1186, 1189
(10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Tedesco, 441 F. Supp.
1336, 1342, (M.D. Pa. 1977). See also United States v.
Olin Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
210 United States v. Roberts, No. Cr. 70-927 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 2, 1980); United States v. Leverage Funding Sys.,
478 F. Supp. 799 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
munication between prospective witnesses and de-
fense counsel. It is unprofessional conduct for the
prosecutor to advise any person or cause any person
to be advised to decline to give to the defense
information which he has the right to give. 2 11 The
federal courts likewise have adhered to the princi-
ple that prosecutors, in conducting their preindict-
ment activities, may not interfere with defense
counsel's attempts to interview the grand jury wit-
nesses. The prosecutor cannot tell a witness not to
talk to the defense;2 12 he cannot impose a require-
ment that a witness report back to him if he is
interviewed by the defense;21 3 and the prosecutor
cannot require that the interview be conducted in
his presence.
2 14
B. THE TIMING OF INDICTMENTS
Federal prosecutors are not obliged to file crim-
inal charges as soon as probable cause is estab-
lished.215 Deciding when to indict is left to the
prosecutors' discretion. The courts have held, how-
ever, that if actual prejudice results from prein-
dictment delay,21 6 the defendant's fifth amendment
due process right has been violated. 7 There is no
per se rule that establishes, as a matter of law, what
period of delay is unreasonable and thereby war-
rants dismissal. 21 8 The federal courts typically re-
211 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 3. 1 (c).
212 See United States v. Matlock, 491 F.2d 504, 506
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 864 (1974) (such instruc-
tion is improper).
213 See, e.g., In re Proceedings Before the Grand Jury
Summoned October 12, 1970, 321 F. Supp. 238 (N.D.
Ohio 1970) (condemning the practice).
214 Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C.
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969) (defendant's
right to fair trial violated when prosecutor advised witness
not to talk to defense counsel without prosecutor present).
See also United States v. Scott, 518 F.2d 261, 268 (6th
Cir. 1975); Coppolino v. Helpren, 266 F. Supp. 930, 935
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). Witnesses, of course, have the right to
refuse to be interviewed if that is their desire apart from
prosecutor's wishes. United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364,
1374 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 954 (1977); United
States v. Dryden, 423 F.2d 1175, 1177 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Byrnes v. United States, 327
F.2d 825, 832 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 970 (1964).
... See United States v. Stanyione, 466 F. Supp. 838
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. Passman, 465 F. Supp.
736 (W.D. La. 1979).
216 United States v. Quinn, 540 F.2d 357 (8th Cir.
1976); United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834 (D.C.Cir.
1975). But see United States v. Foddrell, 523 F.2d 86 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 (1975).
217 Sixth amendment speedy trial rights are not trig-
gered until arrest or indictment. See United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).21
1 See United States v. Sand, 541 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir.
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view the facts of each case to determine whether
the time elapsed "has impaired the defendant's
ability to defend himself." '219 The defendant must
plead specific facts demonstrating prejudice result-
ing from preindictment delay.2 ° When the absence
of a witness is the basis for the claim of prejudice
caused by delay, the courts have required a show-
ing that the witness "could have supplied material
evidence for the defense.
'221
There is a split of authority among the federal
courts as to whether one must show both substan-
tial prejudice and intentional delay on the part of
the government or only one of the two.Y2 Which-
ever standard for dismissal is imposed, prosecutors
must be sensitive to the potential loss of evidence
caused by any delay and should move as promptly
as possible toward a resolution of all criminal
matters under investigation so that a putative de-
fendant's rights will not be infringed by the passage
of time at the preindictment stage.
C. BARGAINING FOR TESTIMONY UNDER IMMUNITY
The usual procedure in the federal system for
obtaining a grant of statutory immunity for a
witness begins with the attorney for the witness
presenting a proffer of his client's prospective tes-
timony.2 There is no statutory requirement that
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103 (1977) (15-month delay
did not prejudice defendant despite death of two possible
witnesses and claimed loss of physical evidence); United
States v. Quinn, 540 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1976) (10-month
delay was unreasonable because witness had disap-
peared); United States v. Finkelstein, 526 F.2d 517 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 960 (1976) (more than
four years' delay not prejudicial); United States v.
MacClain, 501 F.2d 1006 (10th Cir. 1974) (39-month
delay between commencement of investigation and in-
dictment did not result in sufficient prejudice, especially
in the absence of any evidence that the delay was pur-
posefully designed to gain some tactical advantage).
219 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966);
United States v. Hood, 593 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1979);
accord, United States v. Golden, 436 F.2d 941, 943 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 910 (1971); United States v.
Deloney, 389 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904
(1968); In re Special Grand Jury, 465 F. Supp. 800 (D.
Md. 1978).
22 See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
22i United States v. Page, 544 F.2d 982, 985 (8th Cir.
1976). See also United States v. Naftalin, 534 F.2d 770,
773 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976); Hodges v.
United States, 408 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1969).
2 See United States v. Willis, 583 F.2d 203 (5th Cir.
1978) (requiring a showing of both prejudice and inten-
tional delay); United States v. Brown, 578 F.2d 1280 (9th
Cir. 1978) (defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice
to prevail). See also United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670
(9th Cir. 1977).
See Bauer, Reflections on the Role of Statutory Immunity
a proffer be made.224 The Department of Justice
procedure, however, requires the local United
States attorney conducting the investigation to
submit a summary of the witness' proposed testi-
mony along with other information for evaluation
by Department ofJustice personnel in Washington,
D.C., before immunity will be granted.2
Once the proffer is obtained, the local federal
prosecutor evaluates the credibility and value of
the information to the government in the case or
matter under investigation. The government either
accepts the proffer and grants the witness immu-
nity or rejects the proffer and proceeds with its
investigation without the benefit of the witness'
testimony.
The opinion of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit analyzed the immu-
nity negotiation proffer procedure in United States
v. Rothman.s26 In that case the government was
considering immunizing Rothman, but first
wanted to know what his testimony would be.
Rothman briefly revealed what he would say, but
the government declined to immunize him. Roth-
man argued that since he cooperated with the
government by complying with the government's
request to know what his testimony would be, the
government was bound to immunize him. The
court rejected that argument stating:
Immunity was only a possibility with the final de-
cision to be made by the government after evaluat-
ing the testimony Rothman offered. By merely mak-
in the Criminal Justice System, 67 J. CRiM. L. & C. 143
(1976).
224 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1976) requires that the United
States attorney obtain "the approval of the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General or any designated
Assistant Attorney General" before petitioning the court
for an immunity order. The determination for seeking
immunity under the statute requires that the local United
States attorney with the approval of one of the designated
Department of Justice personnel determine that "(1) the
testimony or other information from such individual may
be necessary to the public interest; and (2) such individ-
ual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide
other information on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination." 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1976).
'5 The information the local United States attorney
must submit to the Department ofJustice in Washington,
D.C., to obtain immunity authorization includes a sum-
mary of the witness' anticipated testimony, as well as
information about the background of the case; the wit-
ness' part in the matter under investigation; how the
witness' testimony may be necessary to the public inter-
est; why the witness is likely to invoke the fifth amend-
ment privilege; and what offenses may be disclosed by
the witness under the grant of immunity.
226 567 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1977).
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ing the proffer, Rothman could not thereby bind the
government. His offer was not accepted. Rothman
would have us abandon the usual accepted concepts
of applicable contract law and fashion some new
standard for these circumstances. We decline, for to
do so would unnecessarily destroy immunity as a
useful prosecutorial technique.22
7
The Rothman court did not address the issue of
the effect of the proffered information or the leads
derived from that information once the govern-
ment declines to immunize the witness. Proffers of
testimony between defense counsel and prosecutors
are considered to be "off the record," and if the
proffer is rejected, both sides to the negotiations
theoretically should be placed in the same position
as before the proffer because the government by
receiving the proffer gains valuable information
about its possible case, and the witness, if still a
potential defendant after rejection of the proffer,
receives nothing for having made the proffer.=
Even though the government cannot use the prof-
fered information against the witness in its case in
chief, leads therefrom can be used unless there was
a bargained for prohibition against their use.ss
If prosecutors, by their conduct in negotiating
with a witness for immunity, cause the witness to
believe that his proffered statements will not be
used against him in any way, the government may
be bound.2' ° Therefore, prosecutors must be ex-
tremely careful not to make erroneous offers of
immunity that could mislead a witness to waive his
privilege against self-incrimination. Defense coun-
27Id. at 747.
m It is possible that the witness may have even antag-
onized the government personnel on the case by profer-
ring what the prosecutor believes to be false information.
22 Without an agreement, the proffer, just like im-
munized testimony, could be used against the witness to
impeach him. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971); United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974). Moreover, without
an agreement to the contrary, the government could use
the proffered information to find other information that
could be used against the witness. The defendant in
Rothman did not contend that the government violated its
promise not to use any leads arising from Rothman's
proffer against him.
'23 See Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S.
341, 347-48 (1963); United States v. Society of Indepen-
dent Gasoline Marketers of America, No. 77-2515 (4th
Cir. Dec. 26, 1979); United States v. Nussen, 531 F.2d 15
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976); United States
v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846
(1968). See also United States v. Garcia, 519 F.2d 1343,
1345 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting United States v. Goodrich,
493 F.2d 390, 393 (9th Cir. 1974)); In re Kelly, 350 F.
Supp. 1198, 1199-200 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
sel must be careful to understand clearly the pa-
rameters of the proffer agreement. In sum, it is
important that the proffer arrangement be unam-
biguous and plainly understood by both sides.2
31
A problem inherent in the government's require-
ment that a witness or his lawyer present a proffer
of proposed testimony is that the witness may feel
pressured to conform his testimony to the govern-
ment's prosecutorial theory.23' In United States v.
International Paper Co.23 the defense in attacking the
proffer system argued that the government's an-
nounced position offering immunity for testimony
that would advance its investigation was "coercive
and likely lead to deliberate or unconscious mis-
statements."
' '
The original proffer of one witness in the Inter-
national Paper case, Charles Blanchard, was that
certain conspiratorial conversations took place in
either "late 1974 or early 1975." Before immunity
was conferred on Mr. Blanchard, one of the pros-
ecutors telephoned Mr. Blanchard's attorney and
explained that immunity would be recommended
for Mr. Blanchard only if he testified that the
conversations occurred in 1975.2 The witness sub-
sequently did so testify and provided a reason,
apart from the prosecutor's statements, for choos-
ing 1975 as opposed to 1974.236 The court rejected
the defense argument, stating:
Although the government concedes, as indeed it
must, that there is some inherent possibility of a
witness's coloring his story to get immunity, it con-
tends that the likelihood is slight, that it has not
been shown to have occurred here, and that the
remedy, if any remedy is needed, is in the right of
defense attorneys to cross-examine immunized wit-
nesses about their bargains at trial.23
7
Despite the court's rationale, prosecutors must be
sensitive to the psychological pressure caused by
231 See United States v. Carvin, 553 F.2d 871 (4th Cir.
1977).
232 See generally Wolfson, Immunity, Right or Wrong?
Wrong!, 57 Cms. B. REc. 174 (1976).
53 457 F. Supp. 571 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
2Id. at 576.
23 International Paper was a Sherman Act price-fixing
criminal conspiracy prosecution. The sentencing provi-
sions of the Sherman Act were amended in December
1974 making a violation thereof after the date of the
amendment a felony. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Therefore,
whether acts in furtherance of the conspiracy took place
in 1974 or 1975 made a crucial difference in whether the
defendants were subject to misdemeanor or felony liabil-
ity.
236 457 F. Supp. at 576 n.5.
237 Id. at 576.
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suggestions, especially when coupled with the bene-
fit of absolution from criminal liability conferred
by an immunity grant. Since such suggestion could
cause a witness to fashion his testimony according
to the prosecution's desires, it is, therefore, neces-
sary for prosecutors to refrain from coaxing or
coaching a particular theory of how or when par-
ticular events happened. An erroneous story may
result and justice thereby be denigrated.
D. THE PROSECUTOR'S DECISION TO SEEK AN
INDICTMENT
The decision to seek an indictment is one that
falls clearly within the prosecutor's discretion.=
The Supreme Court in Blackledge v. Perry,23' how-
ever, declared that the federal courts may intervene
in the prosecutorial decision to indict when it is
demonstrated that the prosecution is motived by
"vindictiveness." The prosecutor in Blackledge
brought a second indictment on a more serious
charge against a defendant who was appealing his
conviction of a lesser offense. The Supreme Court
held that actual prosecutorial vindictiveness
against the defendant did not have to exist for the
prosecutor's action to be unconstitutional. The
court stated that if the prosecutor, by bringing the
second charge, was seeking to discourage the de-
fendant from exercising a constitutional or statu-
tory right, the prosecutor's actions were consitu-
tionally impermissible.
4 0
Under what appears to be the Blackledge defini-
tion of prosecutorial vindictiveness, the personal
bad faith and evil motivation of the prosecutor is
immaterial. To determine whether the prosecutor's
action in commencing prosecution falls outside
that permitted by the constitution, the federal
courts look to the purpose of the action as related
to the potential effect on the defendant's rights.
The courts have placed varying interpretations
on the phrase "prosecutorial vindictiveness." The
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Groves24' recognized
that courts need not find that the prosecutor was
motivated by personal bad faith in prosecuting the
defendant and held that the appearance of vindic-
tiveness is sufficient to justify dismissal of the
2S See U.S. Department of Justice Materials Relating
to Prosecutorial Discretion, reprinted in [1978] 24 CRim. L.
REP. (BNA) 3001. The ABA PRosEcUrION STANDARDS,
supra note 8, § 3.9, also address the exercise of prosecuto-
rial discretion in bringing a formal charge.
m 9417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974).
240 id.
2' 571 F.2d 450, 453-55 (9th Cir. 1978). Contra, United
States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979)
(appearance of vindictiveness insufficient).
charges. In United States v. Litton Systems, Inc.242 the
Fourth Circuit declined to find impermissible vin-
dictiveness absent a showing of retaliatory motive.
In United States v. McFadyen-Snide243 the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an
indictment because "the indictment and the rea-
sons for bringing it have the effect of punishing the
defendant for pursuing an appeal." 2"
The Supreme Court in Bordenkircher v. Hayes
245
appeared to retreat from its Blackledge holding con-
demning prosecutorial vindictiveness. Closer scru-
tiny of the Hayes decision indicates that the court
carved out an exception for such conduct to pre-
serve and support the plea bargaining system as a
means of disposing of cases. 1 6 Defendant Hayes
was indicted on the relatively minor charge of
uttering a forged instrument. 47 The prosecutor
told Hayes during plea negotiations that, because
of Hayes' prior criminal record, he would add on
an additional indictment against Hayes under the
state's habitual criminal statute with a mandatory
life sentence if Hayes declined to plead guilty to
the original charge. Hayes refused to plead guilty,
and the prosecutor carried out his threat. The Sixth
Circuit disapproved,' but the Supreme Court,
242 573 F.2d 195, 198-200 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 828 (1978); accord, United States v. Vaughan, 565
F.2d 283, 284-85 (4th Cir. 1977). Both of these cases,
however, arose in the plea bargaining context which has
been given different triatment by the courts. See Borden-
kircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
243 590 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1979). See Jackson v. Walker,
585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978).
2" 590 F.2d at 655; accord, Lovett v. Butterworth, 610
F.2d 1002 (1st Cir. 1979).
245 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
246 See, e.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71
(1977) (guilty plea and plea bargaining system are im-
portant components of the country's criminal justice
system); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61
(1971) (plea bargaining should be encouraged if properly
administered). The majority Justices in Hayes most cer-
tainly considered the importance of the plea bargain
system to the crowded federal court docket, especially in
light of the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976).
247 The amount of the check he allegedly forged was
$88.30. The offense was punishable by two to ten years
in ison. 434 U.S. at 358.
Hayes v. Cowen, 547 F.2d 42, 43 (6th Cir. 1976)
(the court stated that the principles of Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), protect "defendants from
vindictive exercise of the prosecutorial discretion." The
Sixth Circuit probably would have approved the conduct
if the penalties were not increased. See United States v.
Sturgill, 563 F.2d 307, 309 (6th Cir. 1977) (addition of
two counts after defendant exercised right to trial ap-
proved because potential penalties the same).
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with four Justices dissenting,2 9 approved the pros-
ecutor's actions.
As a result of the Hayes decision, most federal
courts have applied a more permissive standard
approving seemingly vindictive conduct in the plea
bargain setting.2 °
Of course, outside the plea bargaining arena, the
more stringent Blackledge standard against prose-
cutorial vindictiveness still applies.251 Once a de-
fendant has demonstrated a prima facie case of
vindictiveness, the government is typically ac-
corded the opportunity to justify the prosecutor's
decision to file charges. 22 There are several justi-
fications that have been held sufficient to surmount
vindictiveness charges by a defendant. Where pro-
secutorial action in bringing charges appears to
coincide with a defendant's exercise of certain guar-
anteed rights, prosecutors can justify their acts by
demonstrating that the evidence upon which later
charges were based was not known at an earlier
time or that charges were delayed to protect an
informant's identity rather than to punish a suc-
cessful appellant.53
2'9 434 U.S. at 367-68 (Blackmun, J., with Brennan
& Marshall, JJ., dissenting); id. at 372-73 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("[slince the prosecutor's admitted purpose
was to penalize Hayes for exercising his right to trial, the
conduct was constitutionally impermissible").
2° See, e.g., United States v. Allsup, 573 F.2d 1141,
1143-44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 961 (1978) (bring-
ing gun charges against defendant who refused to accept
plea bargain proposal in bank robbery prosecution held
proper); United States v. Litton Sys., Inc., 573 F.2d 195,
198-200 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 828 (1978) (bring-
ing criminal fraud charges against government contractor
who refused to relinguish contract in exchange for no
prosecution held proper). But see United States v. Stacey,
571 F.2d 440, 443-44 (8th Cir. 1978) (even though de-
fendant's demand for return of lawfully seized funds was
a factor in prosecutor's decision to indict, prosecution not
impermissibly vindictive because demand for funds is not
a statutory right with due process implications).
" See, e.g., James v. Rodriquez, 553 F.2d 59, 62 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 889 (1977) (filing of charge
under habitual criminal statute at retrial after reversal of
conviction unconstitutional interference with right of
appeal); United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1228
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977) (filing more
serious charge to penalize defendant for exercising venue
rights impermissible conduct).
12 See, e.g., Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 300-
03 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049 (1977) (remand
to district court to allow prosecutor to present evidence
on whether defendant's exercise of his rights motivated
prosecutor to add new charges).
'aSee United States v. Nell, 570 F.2d 1251, 1254-55
(5th Cir. 1978) (alleged crimes that form basis of second
indictment, brought after reversal of earlier conviction,
not known earlier; fact that crimes were known before
In deciding whether to prosecute, a federal pros-
ecutor in the proper conduct of his office should
consider Department of Justice policies2 even
though the federal courts have consistently ex-
pressed reluctance to dismiss an indictment
brought in violation of Department of Justice pol-
icy when the dismissal is resisted by the prosecu-
tor. 25 Such resistance on the part of federal pros-
ecutors is improper, but a defendant is without
redress. Federal prosecutors must be careful to
conform with the policy guidelines because the
courts may soon change their position of reluctance
and mandate compliance by dismissing actions
when the policies are not followed.
CONCLUSION
In the decades to come, preindictment prosecu-
torial conduct will continue to face increasing scru-
tiny by the courts in the federal system. The re-
cording of all proceedings before a federal grand
jury will aid the courts in that pursuit. Recording
the proceedings, however, will not serve as a check
of prosecutorial misconduct if persons adversely
affected by improper preindictment conduct are
unable to obtain access to the recording and
thereby discover the impropriety. Most impro-
priety to date has been uncovered fortuitously. 
appeal does not make second indictment impermissible
prosecutorial conduct); United States v. Partifka, 561
F.2d 118, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1037 (1977)
(filing of second indictment after successful appeal by
defendant of earlier charge not impermissible because
motivation of government in delaying the filing of the
second indictment was to protect informant's identity
and charges filed promptly once identity revealed).
25' Probably the best known prosecutorial policy of the
Department of Justice is the Petite Policy, which derives
its name from Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 530-
31 (1960), in which the Solicitor General confessed error
because the Petite prosecution involved a federal indict-
ment arising out of the same transaction for which the
defendant had been prosecuted in state court. Depart-
ment of Justice policy prohibits such prosecutions. Other
examples of the Petite policy's application that have
reached the Supreme Court are Rinaldi v. United States,
434 U.S. 22 (1977), and Watts v. United States, 422 U.S.
1032 (1975). See also Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S.
264 (1966) (prosecution of noncommercial consensual
mailings of obscene material; prosecution violated De-
partment of Justice policy and confession of error was
entered).
' See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 572 F.2d 1359,
1360 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842
(1978) (district court is without authority to grant de-
fendant's motion to dismiss prosecution brought in viola-
tion of Department of Justice policy).
25 See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir.
1979) (defense learned of impropriety because prosecu-
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Because of the increasing importance of the prein-
dictment phase in the federal criminal justice sys-
tem, the federal courts must become sensitive to
the necessity that fuller disclosure be granted de-
fendants regarding the preindictment process.
The October 1979 decision in In re Grand Jury
Proceedings2 57 indicates that at least one federal
court recognizes the need for fuller disclosure of
grand jury recordings. In that case a district judge
for the Northern District of Georgia ordered the
Department of Justice to furnish a putative de-
fendant in a criminal antitrust investigation with
tor's prejudicial comments were made when individual
witnesses were present in the grand jury room and tran-
scripts of their testimony was disclosed to defense counsel
as Brady material); United States v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 435 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Okla. 1977) (transcripts of
exculpatory testimony not revealed to grand jury not
turned over until just before trial.
257 [19791 26 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2089 (N.D. Ga. Oct.
10, 1979). The government is appealing the decision. See
[1979] 937 Anmusr & TADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-25-
26.
"a statement of issues and summary of such factual
matters as may be pertinent to the decision by the
responsible official to authorize or not to authorize
a request for a criminal indictment with respect to
the subject matter of the proceedings before the
... grand jury."
'
Although the courts must be careful to maintain
the requirement of grand jury secrecy and the
historic purpose of the grand jury process, the
decision from the Northern District of Georgia may
signal, as the decade of the 1980's commences, a
new era of more open disclosure at the preindict-
ment stage in the federal system. This increased
disclosure will enable those subjected to the scru-
tiny of the preindictment investigatory process in
the federal criminal justice system to be better
informed whether that process functioned properly
or was affected by improper preindictment prose-
cutorial conduct.
m [1979] 26 CraM. L. REP. (BNA) 2089 (N.D. Ga. Oct.
10, 1979).
